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Abstract  
 
Why  do  some  non-democracies  experience  ethnic  conflict  on  a  greater  scale  than  others  
in  the  post-Cold  War  era?  This  thesis  examines  variance  in  ethnic  conflict  outcomes  through  
regression  analysis  of  a  16-year  period  (1990-2005)  as  a  result  of  differences  in  regime  type  and  
characteristics.  Although  a  broad  literature  exists  on  the  causes  of  civil  conflict  and  its  potential  
relationship  to  regimes,  I  show  that  identifying  specific  behaviors  common  to  certain  subsets  of  
ethnically  divided  regimes  helps  to  predict  their  likelihood  of  ethnic  conflict  in  particular.  I  find  
strong  results:  that  anocracies  are  more  likely  to  experience  ethnic  conflict  than  autocracies;  
that  non-democracies  with  multiple  parties  are  more  likely  to  experience  ethnic  conflict  than  
those  without  parties;  and  that  non-democracies  with  military  involvement  in  politics  are  more  
likely  to  experience  ethnic  conflict  than  those  without  military  involvement.  Additionally,  this  
study  introduces  a  second  scale  measure,  level  of  conflict,  as  measured  through  battle  and  
civilian  casualties.  I  find  mixed  results:  that  anocracies  have  less  conflict  deaths  than  
autocracies;  that  non-democracies  with  multiple  parties  have  no  notable  difference  in  casualties  
than  those  without  parties;  and  that  non-democracies  with  military  involvement  have  more  
conflict  deaths  than  those  without  military  involvement.  Ultimately,  these  findings  contribute  to  
two  literatures.  Regime  characteristics  are  proven  to  be  strong  indicators  of  specific  effects  on  
conflict  likelihood,  which  potentially  helps  to  advance  the  study  of  regime  classification.  Levels  
of  conflict  are  emphasized  as  an  important  dependent  measure,  and  relationships  between  some  
regime  characteristics  and  ethnic  conflict  levels  are  established  as  significant,  contributing  to  the  
larger  study  of  ethnic  conflict. 
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Preface  
 
 
On  India 
Everyone  wants  to  know  where  they  come  from.  Last  year,  I  visited  India  for  the  first  
time  since  beginning  college.  I  was  used  to  going  every  few  years  just  to  visit  family,  but  this  
time  was  special  because  I  wanted  something  different.  I  wanted  to  learn  more  about  my  family  
and  my  identity:  a  common  enough  desire  for  a  first-generation  American.   
With  my  cousins,  I  hiked  up  the  walls  of  Golconda  fort  in  Hyderabad,  a  crossroads  for  
many  different  peoples.  I  learned  it  had  been  built  by  Hindu  rulers  several  centuries  ago,  but  
had  been  conquered  by  Muslim  rulers,  who  made  their  capital  for  many  decades  further.  
Surrounding  this  and  the  Old  City  were  Muslim-dominant  communities,  and  sprawling  beyond  
were  Hindu  communities.  I  was  told  many  Muslims  who  lived  in  Hyderabad  claimed  Northern  
ancestry  akin  to  the  Mughals,  even  though  it  was  likely  that  most  of  their  ancestors  had  been  
indigenous  and  had  converted  to  Islam.  It  seemed  that  one’s  identity  could  change,  for  all  
intents  and  purposes,  based  on  the  environment.  Genetics  might  have  proven  many  of  those  
ancestral  claims  false,  but  that  did  not  matter  in  the  larger  context.  What  mattered  was  who  was  
Muslim,  and  who  was  Hindu:  the  stronger  you  were  attached  to  one  group,  especially  
ancestrally,  the  better.  
I  had  a  vivid  conversation  later  with  my  grandparents  at  the  dinner  table  as  I  scribbled  
down  family  trees  and  asked  questions.  I  knew  my  religion  was  Hindu,  my  caste  was  Brahmin,  
and  my  language  was  Telugu,  but  as  they  spoke  I  learned  more  of  the  complex  undercurrent  that  
defined  ethnicity  in  such  a  diverse  country.  Religion,  caste,  and  language  were  the  surface  
identifiers  I  knew  of  my  family;  I  found  that  the  specific  Brahmin  clan,  and  religious  philosophy ,  
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and  ancestral  home  all  played  into  my  grandparents’  identities  and  therefore  my  own.  Not  
everyone  will  recognize  my  full  identity  if  I  tell  them,  but  to  the  people  that  will  recognize  it,  it  is  
valuable  information  about  who  I  am  and  where  I  come  from.  
As  we  drove  through  the  streets  of  Hyderabad  another  day,  I  recalled  the  keen  interest  
my  father  took  in  previous  years  in  Indian  politics.  The  Indian  state  of  Andhra  Pradesh  in  2014  
split  into  two  states:  Telangana  (which  housed  the  city  of  Hyderabad)  and  the  new  Andhra  
Pradesh.  Violence  surrounded  the  movement  for  secession,  and  a  common  narrative  among  
protestors  and  the  media  was  that  it  was  them  versus  us ;  Telangana  had  a  different  dialect  of  
Telugu,  had  a  different  history,  and  had  a  much  different  population  thanks  to  Hyderabad  and  
the  intermixing  of  race  and  religion.  The  violence  that  had  so  suddenly  erupted  and  been  fueled  
by  political  parties  vanished  from  the  public  eye  just  as  quickly  after  the  split,  so  how  real  were  
those  differences?  I  found  it  curious  how  my  father,  who  was  from  Guntur  in  Andhra  Pradesh  
yet  grew  up  in  Hyderabad  in  Telangana,  could  have  a  foot  in  both  worlds.  Because  my  mother  
taught  me  Telugu,  I  have  an  Andhra  accent  when  speaking  it,  as  does  my  father  at  home;  but  put  
him  next  to  someone  speaking  the  Telangana  dialect  in  Hyderabad,  and  he  will  swim  in  it  
luxuriously.   
Defining  an  ethnicity  by  dialect,  then,  is  rather  murky.  Defining  an  ethnicity  by  ancestry  
is  inexact.  Factors  like  caste  can  affect  some  aspects  of  life,  but  not  others.  And  after  speaking  
with  my  family,  I  was  introduced  to  a  whole  host  of  new  dimensions.  
I  was  finding  ethnicity  to  be  a  slippery  subject. 
On  America 
Almost  an  entire  year  prior  to  my  trip  to  India,  I  took  my  first  comparative  politics  
classes  at  the  University  of  Michigan.  One  of  them  stood  out  to  me  because  it  was  titled  “How  to  
be  an  Autocrat”,  taught  by  Professor  Mai  Hassan.  Handy,  I  thought  to  myself,  if  I  ever  achieve 
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my  ambition  when  I  was  six  to  take  over  the  world.  Although  that  particular  goal  has  not  been  
accomplished  to  date,  I  found  the  subject  material  to  be  fascinating:  we  live  in  a  world  of  diverse  
regimes,  of  one  hundred  colors  of  violence.  Learning  of  the  aspects  that  define  an  authoritarian  
regime  was  the  beginning,  to  me,  of  learning  to  understand  how  the  structure  of  a  regime  and  its  
institutions  can  shape  outcomes  like  conflict  seen  within  a  nation’s  borders.   
For  me,  this  thesis  is  a  personal  story.  My  ethnicity  has  always  been  a  part  of  who  I  am,  
and  it  stands  to  reason  that  it  can  be  a  strong  motivator  for  nationalism  and  for  violence  under  
the  right  circumstances.  The  importance  of  ethnic  differences  can  be  exacerbated  and  used  as  a  
political  tool,  as  seen  in  the  Telangana  secession  and  in  the  religious  tensions  in  Hyderabad  
today,  capitalized  upon  by  current  political  parties.  Though  a  democracy,  these  same  behaviors  
seen  in  India  are  seen  extensively  across  non-democratic  countries.  As  I  learned  in  class,  
authoritarian  regimes  and  their  elites  have  a  unique  set  of  institutions  and  motivations.  I  believe  
that  there  are  aspects  within  these  regime  types  that  lend  themselves  in  particular  to  using  
ethnicity  as  a  means  to  achieve  their  goals.  Ultimately,  I  hope  to  understand  ethnic  conflict  by  
viewing  it  through  the  eyes  of  non-democracies.  
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Introduction  
 
The  Case  of  Rwanda 
In  April  1994,  Rwandan  President  Juvenal  Habyarimana  was  returning  to  the  
presidential  residence  near  the  capital  of  Kigali  when  his  plane  was  unexpectedly  shot  down  by  
anti-aircraft  missiles,  killing  him  and  all  other  officials  aboard  the  aircraft.  This  assassination  
triggered  a  horrific  genocide  and  civil  war  in  Rwanda,  where  ethnic  tensions  had  been  brewing  
for  several  years  between  the  Hutus  and  Tutsis  prior  to  the  incident.  In  preceding  years,  the  
extrastate  Tutsi  organization  RPF  (Rwandan  Patriotic  Front)  had  conducted  attacks  across  the  
Rwanda-Uganda  border  against  Habyarimana’s  Hutu  government,  and  an  uneasy  peace  
between  the  two  groups  had  been  reached  in  1993  through  the  Arusha  Accords.   1
The  Rwandan  Hutu  government  at  the  time  of  the  assassination  blamed  the  RPF  and  its  
leader  Paul  Kagame,  accusing  him  of  continuing  the  previous  attacks  and  attempting  to  
destabilize  the  government.  Kagame  denied  any  part  in  the  killing,  and  further  accused  the  Hutu  
government  of  committing  it  themselves  to  create  a  pretext  for  the  ethnic  cleansing  of  hundreds  
of  thousands  of  Rwandan  Tutsis.  It  would  seem  that  Kagame  was  closer  to  the  truth  of  the  
situation,  as  inside  government  events  would  prove.  Hard-liners  in  Habyarimana’s  government  
who  had  disliked  the  terms  of  the  Arusha  Accords,  which  incorporated  Tutsi  forces  into  the  
militia,  saw  their  chance  to  take  back  military  and  political  power.  Supported  by  these  
politicians,  the  FAR  (national  forces)  and  the  loosely-organized  Interahamwe  militia  went  on  
their  campaign  of  terror.   The  now-extremist  Hutu  government  perpetrated  massacres  against  2
1  Nikuze,  “The  Genocide  against  the  Tutsi  in  Rwanda:  Origins,  Causes,  Implementation,  Consequences,  and  the  
Post genocide  Era”,  1089.  
2  Idean  Salehyan,  Rebels  without  Borders:  Transnational  Insurgencies  in  World  Politics ,  147.  
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the  Tutsi  population  and  moderate  Hutus  within  the  country,  killing  an  estimated  800,000  
people  in  the  space  of  one  hundred  days.  
The  Rwandan  genocide  and  civil  war  remains  one  of  the  most  recognizable  and  morbid  
examples  of  extreme  warfare  along  ethnic  lines,  but  there  are  particular  aspects  to  this  case  that  
stand  out  when  assessing  the  causes  of  conflict.   
First,  the  historical  context  is  important  to  understand.  The  Hutu-Tutsi  distinction  was  
enforced  by  Belgian  colonizers,  who  placed  minority  Tutsis  (who  they  believed  to  be  racially  
superior)  in  advantageous  positions  within  their  administration  over  the  majority  Hutu  group.  
This  group  distinction  became  the  most  important  ethnic  division  in  Rwanda  even  after  the  
colonial  period,  and  political  groups  formed  around  each  ethnicity  as  it  became  a  mobilizing  cry  
once  the  government  was  opened  to  majority  rule.   3
Second,  the  political  context  matters  to  explain  why  events  spiraled  out  of  control  the  
way  that  they  did.  Post-1990,  Rwanda  remained  fundamentally  undemocratic,  with  some  
classifying  it  as  a  full  dictatorship.   Although  technically  Rwanda  was  considered  to  have  4
multiple  parties,  the  reality  of  ethnic  power  balance  was  that  the  Hutu  ethnic  group  had  a  
monopoly  on  government  and  the  Tutsi  ethnic  group  was  discriminated  against  at  the  center  of  
power.   In  practice,  this  peculiar  duality  meant  that,  while  on  the  surface  level  institutions  5
typically  common  to  democracies  existed,  their  implementation  afforded  the  executive  and  
political  elites  unregulated  access  to  power  while  repressing  interests  contrary  to  their  own;  a  
hallmark  of  non-democratic  regimes.   It  then  comes  as  no  surprise  that  a  direct  consequence  of  6
this  structure  was  a  lack  of  checks  on  the  actions  of  individual  politicians,  which  allowed  events  
3  Nikuze,  “The  Genocide  against  the  Tutsi  in  Rwanda:  Origins,  Causes,  Implementation,  Consequences,  and  the  
Post genocide  Era”,  1089-90. 
4  Svolik,  “Regime  Data.” 
5  Cederman  et  al.,  “Ethnic  Power  Relations  dataset.” 
6  Marshall  et  al.,   “Polity  IV  Project:  Political  Regime  Characteristics  and  Transitions,  1800-2018.” 
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to  spiral  out  of  control.  Additionally,  the  level  of  military  involvement  in  the  government  was  
quite  relevant  to  the  scale  on  which  this  war  was  perpetrated.  In  the  years  prior  to  the  
assassination,  the  military  was  directly  involved  in  government  and  the  leader  of  the  executive  
(Habyarimana)  himself  was  an  army  officer.   The  importance  of  the  overinvolvement  of  the  7
military  grew  when  the  FAR  and  Interahamwe  became  an  important  tool  for  the  perpetration  of  
a  political  agenda:  to  ensure  Hutu  domination.   
Third,  the  sheer  number  of  people  that  perished  in  the  hundred  days  of  the  genocide  and  
the  fighting  that  took  place  before  and  after  during  those  four  years  was  astonishing.  For  the  
entire  period  of  the  civil  war,  around  ten  thousand  battle  deaths  were  estimated,  but  this  did  not  
account  for  the  vast  toll  taken  on  the  citizens  of  the  country,  which  numbered  far  higher  than  
that,  easily  crossing  half  a  million  civilians  by  most  estimates.   Several  characteristics  of  the  8
regime,  including  the  extent  to  which  the  executive  and  elites  had  access  to  state  power  and  the  
heavy  involvement  of  the  military  in  government,  were  influential  in  determining  the  outcome  
of  this  conflict.  While  multiple  parties  existed  along  ethnic  lines  which  deepened  ethnic  tensions  
at  the  center  of  power,  the  Hutu  monopoly  meant  unchecked  power  for  the  executive  and  elites,  
who  were  able  to  push  an  unopposed  political  agenda  in  the  years  prior  to  the  conflict.  This  
possibly  increased  the  risk  of  conflict,  along  with  increasing  the  level  of  conflict  seen.  Not  only  
did  military  involvement  in  government  potentially  make  the  occurrence  of  ethnic  conflict  more  
likely,  but  it  also  ensured  quick  mass  mobilization,  which  further  impacted  the  level  of  ethnic  
conflict  as  viewed  through  the  lens  of  casualties.   The  idea  encapsulated  by  this  case  study  is  9
ultimately  that  variation  in  relevant  regime  characteristics  can  be  linked  to  different  conflict  
outcomes.  
7  Svolik,  “Institutions  in  Dictatorships,  1946-2008.” 
8  Gleditsch  et  al.,  “Armed  Conflict  1946-2001:  A  New  Dataset”,  v.  3-2005b. 
9  Stanton,  Dr.  Gregory  G.  “The  Ten  Stages  of  Genocide”. 
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Rwanda  is  an  extreme  example  of  the  phenomenon  of  ethnic  conflict,  to  be  sure,  but  
bears  witness  to  the  perhaps  radical  claim  that  all  ethnic  conflict  has  political  components.  The  
specific  conditions  under  which  tensions  spiraled  out  of  control  may  be  unique,  but  I  believe  
that  the  same  aspects  of  the  regime  discussed  above  are  main  contributors  to  ethnic  conflict  
across  the  globe.  The  complex  ties  between  ethnic  conflict  and  institutions  that  characterize  
regimes  are  fascinating,  and  the  ways  in  which  the  implementation  of  institutions  within  
non-democracies  cause  and  continue  ethnic  conflict  help  to  explain  its  prevalence  and  scale  in  
recent  years.  In  this  thesis,  I  hope  to  explore  the  variation  of  ethnic  conflict  through  an  
institutional  perspective  across  non-democracies  in  particular,  which  ultimately  will  bring  us  
one  step  closer  to  understanding  when  and  how  conflict  occurs.  
Literature  to  date  has  thoroughly  explored  the  potential  causes  of  ethnic  conflict,  viewing  
the  problem  from  an  onset  perspective.  One  area  that  remains  largely  unexplored  is  how  the  
same  factors  that  contribute  to  the  onset  of  conflict  can  ensure  its  continuation;  in  essence,  how  
they  can  increase  the  level  of  conflict.  This  uncharted  territory  is  where  I  seek  to  make  a  
contribution.  By  first  exploring  factors  that  can  affect  the  onset  of  ethnic  conflict  as  a  subset  of  
civil  conflict,  I  hope  to  then  explain  variations  in  the  scale  of  conflict.  The  robust  introduction  to  
conflict  and  regime  literature  will  set  the  stage  for  regression  analysis  using  several  relevant  
datasets,  which  will  indicate  what  particular  relationships  are  present  and  their  relevance  to  the  
larger  question  at  hand.  Ultimately,  finding  the  answer  to  this  question  will  take  me  across  the  
globe  through  over  thirty  cases  of  ethnic  conflict  from  1990  through  2005,  with  many  different  
aspects  and  details;  however,  I  hope  to  find  similar  threads  throughout  these  stories.  
And  so,  we  embark  on  a  journey  to  answer  the  question:  Why  do  some  non-democracies  
experience  ethnic  conflict  on  a  greater  scale  than  others  in  the  post-Cold  War  era? 
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Overview  of  Thesis 
I  will  briefly  outline  the  chapters  in  this  thesis  and  their  structure.  In  Chapter  1,  I  
overview  ethnicity  and  the  nature  of  ethnic  violence.  I  review  several  definitions  of  ethnicity  and  
explanations  for  the  causes  of  ethnic  conflict,  which  I  weave  together  to  create  the  theoretical  
foundation.  Then,  I  go  on  to  discuss  the  study  of  regime  variation  in  Chapter  2,  and  how  
ethnicity  plays  a  unique  role  within  politics.  I  expand  upon  the  conflict  patterns  that  have  been  
studied,  and  hypothesize  what  can  be  expected  in  different  kinds  of  non-democracies.  I  examine  
multiple  axes  of  a  regime,  including  party  system  and  military  involvement,  to  better  
understand  what  aspects  of  non-democracies  can  contribute  to  greater  ethnic  conflict.  In  
Chapter  3,  I  overview  my  hypotheses  once  again  and  explain  relevant  variables,  going  in-depth  
on  previous  studies’  measurements  and  developing  my  own.  I  then  explain  the  
operationalization  of  my  main  variables  through  a  compiled  dataset  and  the  methods  I  use  to  
test  my  hypotheses.  Chapter  4  provides  an  overview  of  my  regression  analysis  and  findings.  
along  with  the  limitations  my  study  may  contain.  Chapter  5   explores  the  applications  of  this  
research  and  further  discusses  the  implications  of  my  results,  and  I  conclude  with  my  
contribution  to  the  continuing  study  of  ethnic  conflict.  
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Chapter  1   
Ethnicity  and  the  Nature  of  Ethnic  Violence  
 
 
Introduction 
The  study  of  ethnic  conflict  has  grown  significantly  over  the  past  couple  of  decades,  for  
many  reasons.  Attention-grabbing  headlines  across  the  globe  proclaiming  conflict  in  a  diverse  
set  of  regions  have  drawn  the  focus  of  the  world.   Broadly,  a  movement  away  from  interstate  1011
conflict  and  toward  civil  conflict  occurred  after  1945  and  has  continued  past  1990  (the  end  of  the  
Cold  War),  of  which  ethnic  conflict  is  a  significant  subset.   The  sheer  diversity  of  the  scale  of  12
these  events  is  staggering;  ethnic  conflicts  have  ranged  from  localized  inter-city  riots  to  
full-blown  genocide,  and  have  involved  hundreds  of  various  ethnic  groups  with  different  levels  
of  relative  power.    Thus,  learning  of  commonalities  and  similar  threads  between  events  is  a  13
challenging  and  sometimes  nigh-impossible  task.  An  extensive  literature  has  developed  
surrounding  the  topic,  not  only  exploring  what  ethnicity  and  ethnic  conflict  is  at  its  most  basic  
level,  but  also  attempting  to  explain  how  ethnic  conflict  arises.   
In  this  chapter,  I  will  explore  the  concept  of  ethnicity  and  define  it  in  the  scope  of  my  
research.  I  will  then  explore  the  implications  this  definition  has  for  the  causes  of  ethnic  conflict,  
along  with  reviewing  several  theories  that  attempt  to  explain  other  mechanisms  by  which  
violence  erupts.  Finally,  I  will  drive  towards  the  idea  that  ethnic  conflict  is  contributed  to  by  
institutions  and  power  distributions,  which  are  influenced  by  the  way  they  are  expressed  within  
the  framework  of  a  non-democratic  regime.  
10  Young,  “The  Heart  of  the  African  Conflict  Zone”,  301-3. 
11  Posner,  Institutions  and  Ethnic  Politics  in  Africa ,  5. 
12  Fearon  and  Laitin,  “Ethnicity,  Insurgency,  and  Civil  War”,  75. 
13  Cederman,  Wimmer,  and  Min,  “Why  Do  Ethnic  Groups  Rebel?”,  87-8. 
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Defining  Ethnicity 
Ethnicity  as  a  concept  is  considered  by  much  of  the  world  to  be  ancient  and  
unchangeable,  and  by  others  as  insubstantial  and  fickle.  Its  base  definition  can  be  summarized  
as  an  “experienced  sense  of  commonality  based  on  the  belief  in  common  ancestry  and  shared  
culture”.   The  importance  of  understanding  ethnicity  in  order  to  explore  ethnic  conflict  cannot  14
be  understated;  as  will  be  seen,  many  of  the  components  to  defining  ethnicity  come  up  again  
when  considering  why  conflict  occurs  along  those  same  lines,  and  where  it  can  be  expected  to  
occur  based  on  how  and  why  ethnic  groups  form.  Four  main  schools  of  thought  will  be  examined  
and  analyzed,  and  every  one  of  them  ultimately  contributes  to  the  further  understanding  of  
ethnicity.   
It  is  easy  and  almost  instinctive  to  make  the  judgement  that  ethnic  conflicts  are  deeply  
rooted,  and  that  the  identities  which  are  involved  in  the  conflict  are  in  fact  what  have  caused  it.  
This  is  the  beginning  of  the  essentialist  argument,  which  first  explains  ethnicity  as  based  on  
preexisting  ethnic  boundaries,  waving  a  hand  at  postcolonial  ethnic  conflicts  as  an  example  of  
pre-modern-state  ethnic  divisions .  While  some  of  the  more  radical  theories  from  this  school  15
have  since  been  contested  by  others,  some  authors  continue  to  employ  mainly  emotional  and  
psychological  approaches  to  understanding  why  ethnicity  forms  and  why  ethnic  groups  behave  
as  they  do.   This  model  of  ethnicity  is  somewhat  rudimentary  compared  to  later  schools  of  16
thought  in  explaining  the  purpose  of  ethnicity,  though  some  attempt  to  justify  its  purpose  in  
policing  “winning”  groups.   Regardless,  essentialism  does  have  its  points,  as  many  ethnic  17
14  Wimmer,  Cederman,  and  Min,  “Ethnic  Politics  and  Armed  Conflict”,  317. 
15  Kaufmann,  “Rational  Choice  and  Progress  in  the  Study  of  Ethnic  Conflict”,  200. 
16  Ibid.,  201. 
17  Caselli  and  Coleman,  “On  the  Theory  of  Ethnic  Conflict”,  162. 
14  
identities  today  have  their  origins  in  history,  and  many  ethnic  conflicts  are  fought  in  a  cycle  of  
violence  as  previous  events  set  the  precedent  to  resolve  intergroup  grievances  through  force.   18
Ethnicity  is  more  fluid  than  essentialism  would  suggest  and  can  exist  in  more  than  one  
dimension:  race,  religion,  and  language  are  examples  of  potential  ethnic  cleavages  in  society.  19
However,  these  divisions  are  not  created  equal,  and  some  become  more  salient  than  others  in  
different  social  and  political  contexts.  Constructivism  suggests  that  ethnic  identities  do  not  
wholly  have  their  roots  in  historical  differences  but  rather  are  influenced  and  manipulated  to  
serve  a  political  purpose,  discounting  the  notion  of  ‘ethnic  membership’  altogether.   Although  20
the  original  ‘strong  form’  of  constructivism  over-attributes  the  formation  of  ethnic  groups  to  
political  manipulation,  newer  work  is  useful  to  understanding  inter-group  behavior  between  
ethnicities,  along  with  explaining  why  new  ethnic  groups  may  rise  over  time.   The  logical  21
extension  of  these  two  separate  concepts  suggests  that  different  cleavages  become  important  in  
different  political  contexts,  as  Daniel  Posner  finds  in  his  2005  book.  He  observes  that,  in  
Zambia,  lingual  differences  become  important  in  forming  constituencies  in  a  multi-party  
government,  whereas  tribal  differences  are  more  salient  under  a  one-party  system  of  rule.   This  22
finding  spurs  further  questions  about  the  uses  of  ethnicity  and  different  ethnic  cleavages  in  
society  as  a  tool  to  obtain  political  power.  
The  structuralist  theory  is  worth  touching  upon  briefly  as  well,  although  much  of  its  
definitions  of  ethnicity  overlap  with  explanations  of  ethnic  conflict;  these  explanations  will  recur  
later  in  this  chapter.  Structuralist  theory  wrestles  with  the  question  of  the  interactions  among  
ethnic  groups  in  an  environment  of  state  collapse,  and  broadly  explores  the  way  security  
18  Andreas  Wimmer  et  al.,  Facing  Ethnic  Conflicts:  Toward  a  New  Realism ,  96-99. 
19  Posner,  Institutions  and  Ethnic  Politics  in  Africa ,  7-10. 
20  Laitin  and  Posner,  “Constructing  Ethnic  Fractionalization  Indices”,  1-3. 
21  Kaufmann,  “Rational  Choice  and  Progress  in  the  Study  of  Ethnic  Conflict”,  197. 
22  Posner,  Institutions  and  Ethnic  Politics  in  Africa ,  17. 
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dilemmas  influence  the  behavior  of  ethnic  groups  aimed  at  preserving  their  own  survival.  23
Structuralism  assumes  the  continuing  existence  of  ethnic  groups  and  does  not  seek  to  explain  
their  origins  and  uses  in  the  same  way  that  essentialist  and  constructivist  viewpoints  do;  in  this  
sense,  structuralist  theories  are  more  suited  to  being  combined  with  one  of  the  previous  two  
perspectives,  as  indeed  they  often  are.  In  conjunction  with  a  ‘weak-form’  constructivist  
viewpoint,  some  authors  in  structuralism  support  that  conflict  contributes  to  the  ‘hardening’  of  
ethnic  identities  that  may  not  have  been  as  robust  prior  to  the  conflict.   24
A  fourth  viewpoint  is  rational-choice.  Rational-choice  in  practice  has  many  similarities  to  
constructivism,  insofar  as  scholars  of  both  schools  take  an  institutionalist  perspective  in  
understanding  when  certain  ethnic  identities  become  important,  looking  especially  at  electoral  
incentives.   However,  rational-choice  breaks  from  the  other  three  theories  in  the  importance  it  25
attributes  to  individual  attachments  to  communal  identity;  it  suggests  that  attempts  to  
maximize  personal  gain  are  more  important  to  outcomes  than  attempts  to  maximize  the  
communal  gain  for  one’s  ethnic  group .  This  perspective  becomes  important  later  when  26
considering  the  role  of  ethnonationalism  in  the  mass  consciousness  as  a  call  to  action,  because  it  
questions  the  validity  of  considering  ethnonationalism  as  a  cause  of  conflict  rather  than  the  
effect.  
The  perspective  taken  on  ethnicity  in  this  thesis  is  a  combination  of  the  stronger  points  
made  by  each  school.  Essentialism  makes  the  operable  observation  that  individuals  do  have  a  
certain  amount  of  attachment  to  ethnic  identity,  and  this  attachment  plays  a  large  role  in  the  
formation  of  political  and  social  groups.  Constructivism  balances  this  claim  by  showing  that  
certain  ethnic  identities  can  be  emphasized  over  others  and  even  manipulated  in  the  pursuit  of  
23  Posen,  “The  Security  Dilemma  and  Ethnic  Conflict”,  27-29. 
24  Kaufmann,  “Rational  Choice  and  Progress  in  the  Study  of  Ethnic  Conflict”,  201. 
25  Wilkinson,  Votes  and  Violence:  Electoral  Competition  and  Ethnic  Riots  in  India ,  6. 
26  Fearon  and  Laitin,  “Explaining  Interethnic  Cooperation”,  715-718. 
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political  power;  however,  there  generally  exists  a  basis  for,  and  a  common  identity  at,  the  core  of  
any  ethnic  group  that  forms.  Structuralism  bolsters  this  argument  further  by  showing  that  
identities  can  increase  in  their  importance  before  and  during  a  conflict.  With  respect  to  
rational-choice,  while  individual  interests  do  play  a  role  in  the  use  of  ethnicity  for  political  ends,  
collective  ethnic  identities  are  powerful  mass  movers.    
The  Causes  of  Ethnic  Conflict 
The  definitions  of  ethnicity  and  ethnic  identity  examined  previously  provide  a  means  of  
understanding  where  ethnic  conflict  can  arise.  The  simplest  definition  of  ethnic  conflict  is  also  a  
useful  one:  ethnic  conflict  happens  when  ethnicity  is  the  most  salient  cleavage  in  society,  and  
violence  breaks  out  along  these  lines.  The  term  used  going  forward  for  such  a  regime  is  
“ethnically  divided”.  This  definition  suggests  that  ethnic  conflict  is  a  subset  of  civil  conflict,  
which  is  how  it  has  been  studied  by  many  authors  in  the  past:  however,  I  argue  that  ethnic  
conflict  should  be  studied  on  its  own  merits,  particularly  because  the  ways  in  which  ethnicity  
becomes  relevant  societally  lend  it  both  to  being  capitalized  upon  by  elites  and  mass  populations  
alike.  I  will  expand  on  the  motives  to  use  ethnicity  for  power,  and  how  this  can  lead  from  mere  
division  to  conflict.  I  will  also  identify  certain  environments  in  which  the  motives  to  capitalize  
on  ethnicity  are  stronger,  and  explain  how  this  may  occur.  
Any  number  of  things  can  come  together  and  escalate  grievances  to  conflict  in  each  
instance;  in  ethnic  conflicts,  though,  several  motifs  can  be  regarded  as  significant.  One  
argument  for  ethnic  conflict  touches  on  the  distribution  of  resources.  While  much  of  the  
argument  can  take  an  overly  essentialist  view  of  ethnicity,  it  makes  an  important  point  that  in  
many  societies,  resources  can  be  equated  with  political  power.  Within  a  quasi-electoral  
environment  specifically,  ethnicity  not  only  acts  as  a  cry  to  action  and  a  motive  to  support  
leaders  of  the  same  identity,  but  it  creates  an  in-group  for  distribution  of  resources  by  victorious  
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elites  that  is  difficult  to  otherwise  penetrate.   From  this  elite  perspective,  ethnicity  is  a  27
compelling  tool  to  form  a  constituency  and  later  a  minimum  winning  coalition.   The  minimum  28
winning  coalition  has  just  enough  supporters  needed  to  gain  power  over  competitors,  while  at  
the  same  time  keeping  the  group  small  enough  that  any  rewards  or  resources  are  distributed  
among  the  least  number  of  people.   Thus,  ethnic  identity  can  be  useful  as  a  stepping  stone  2930
towards  resource  control  and  power:  conflict  can  naturally  follow  from  this  as  rival  elites  seek  to  
create  their  own  ingroups  for  resource  control,  deepening  ethnicity  as  the  salient  cleavage  and  
increasing  intergroup  tensions.  I  postulate  then  that  more  opportunities  for  this  kind  of  group  
competition  on  the  political  stage  will  mean  greater  ethnic  conflict.  
The  electoral  scheme  affects  elites  and  the  masses  alike,  and  helps  to  explain  the  
manifestation  of  political  agendas.  This  institutionalist  perspective  is  useful  to  understand  how  
political  movements  can  trickle  down  through  society,  with  ethnic  conflict  arising  as  a  symptom  
of  central  power  distribution:  constructivist  and  rational-choice  scholars  both  apply  this  
viewpoint,  looking  to  electoral  incentives  to  understand  when  identities  become  important  and  
where  conflict  breaks  out.   Electoral  incentives  themselves  can  change  the  way  ethnicity  31
behaves,  as  demonstrated  by  Posner  (2005).   Studies  of  ethnonationalist  politics  show  that  32
politically  relevant  ethnic  group  representation  is  constantly  shifting,  and  also  shows  that  
excluding  relevant  groups  from  political  power  increases  the  likelihood  of  ethnic  conflict.   This  33
can  be  explained  using  previous  concepts  as  the  following:  elite  manipulation  of  the  political  
landscape  to  gain  power  means  that  ethnic  identities  are  emphasized  where  they  provide  an  
electoral  advantage  to  do  so.  As  a  result,  conflict  can  be  observed  to  take  place  along  certain  
27  Caselli  and  Coleman,  “On  the  Theory  of  Ethnic  Conflict”,  163-5. 
28  Posner,  Institutions  and  Ethnic  Politics  in  Africa ,  17-20. 
29  Bueno  De  Mesquita  et  al.,  “Political  Institutions,  Policy  Choice  and  the  Survival  of  Leaders”,  561. 
30  Caselli  and  Coleman,  “On  the  Theory  of  Ethnic  Conflict”,  162. 
31  Wilkinson,  Votes  and  Violence:  Electoral  Competition  and  Ethnic  Riots  in  India ,  6. 
32  Posner,  Institutions  and  Ethnic  Politics  in  Africa ,  17 
33  Cederman,  Wimmer,  and  Min,  “Why  Do  Ethnic  Groups  Rebel?”,  95 
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cleavages  and  not  others,  divided  by  religion  in  India  and  race  in  Peru,  for  example.   Tying  in  34
with  elite  motivations,  anti-minority  sentiment  among  other  things  can  solidify  the  identity  of  
the  majority  while  assuring  victory  for  the  elite.  These  narratives  have  been  discounted  in  favor  
of  individual  decision-making  as  the  driving  force  behind  conflict  within  the  rational-choice  
school,  but  therefore  creates  an  incomplete  picture  of  both  the  onset  of  the  conflict  and  its  
intensity.   35
The  importance  of  ethnicity  for  the  population  follows  from  the  examination  of  elite  
behavior.  A  group  identity  is  mutually  beneficial  for  elites  who  desire  political  elevation  and  for  
those  among  the  populace  who  share  similar  goals  and  ideals.  The  in-groups  mentioned  
previously  allow  members  of  the  elite’s  ethnicity  to  secure  control  of  resources  and  increase  
their  economic  power  through  preferred  treatment.  The  flip  side  of  this  situation  indicates  that  
economically  disadvantaged  groups  without  ground-level  access  to  resources  have  an  incentive  
to  mobilize  for  large-scale  change,  which  can  lead  to  more  than  one  instance  of  civil  conflict.  36
More  broadly,  mass  ethnic  mobilization  can  and  does  reflect  the  constellation  of  power  at  the  
state’s  center  discussed  earlier.   The  creation  of  in-groups,  or  winning  coalitions,  or  any  other  37
sort  of  exclusionary  faction  is  tightly  woven  with  the  idea  of  ethnonationalism.   
Ethnonationalism  is  influential  within  the  mass  consciousness,  conflating  the  nation’s  
identity  and  governance  with  group  ethnic  identity  and  pushing  mass  action  to  shape  the  state  
in  its  own  image.   As  a  result  of  ethnonationalist  struggle  over  access  to  state  power  at  the  elite  38
level,  mass  mobilization  can  occur  if  groups  feel  excluded  from  resources  or  benefits.  In  societies  
where  there  is  little  opportunity  for  this  discontent  to  be  expressed  or  resolved  through  peaceful  
34  Cederman  et  al.,  “Ethnic  Power  Relations  dataset.” 
35  Wilkinson,  Votes  and  Violence:  Electoral  Competition  and  Ethnic  Riots  in  India ,  6-10. 
36  Walter,  “Does  Conflict  Beget  Conflict?”,  372. 
37  Cederman,  Wimmer,  and  Min,  “Why  Do  Ethnic  Groups  Rebel?”,  88. 
38  Ibid.,  92. 
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means,  mass  mobilization  along  ethnic  lines  can  lead  to  greater  conflict.  Structuralist  literature  
examines  ethnic  group  behavior  in  an  environment  of  anarchy  or  state  collapse,  which  leads  to  
violence  between  groups  as  each  seeks  to  protect  their  own  communal  interests.   Ethnic  conflict  39
does  not  often  occur  even  in  an  environment  of  total  state  collapse,  but  the  pursuit  of  communal  
interests  and  protection  of  the  group’s  overall  security  are  also  motives  that  can  ultimately  be  
relevant  politically.  From  a  practical  standpoint,  this  means  solidifying  social  divisions  and  
excluding  ‘outsiders’  in  a  country  while  fulfilling  the  need  for  scapegoats  in  undesirable  
situations.   40
As  can  be  seen,  the  true  question  driving  at  prevalence  and  scale  of  ethnic  conflict  is  
what  deepens  ethnicity  as  a  salient  societal  cleavage,  and  what  is  at  stake  that  could  prompt  
conflict  to  arise.  The  importance  of  ethnicity  as  a  cleavage  in  society  is  determined  to  a  large  
extent  by  incentives  to  gain  power,  and  ethnic  divisions  are  emphasized  by  elites  when  they  seek  
popular  support.  This  is  not  simply  an  elite  phenomenon,  but  a  mass  one  as  well;  the  role  of  
ethnonationalism  in  excluding  certain  ethnic  groups  from  power  and  therefore  spurring  ethnic  
conflict  is  important  to  better  understand  the  larger  movements  that  take  place  during  a  
protracted  armed  conflict.  Resource  control  is  a  motivation  to  construct  exclusive  ingroups,  as  
seen  from  both  an  elite  and  mass  perspective.  While  all  levels  of  analysis  become  relevant  to  the  
larger  landscape  of  ethnic  conflict,  looking  from  the  center  of  power  outward,  often  from  the  
elites  to  the  masses,  helps  to  explain  why  conflict  takes  place  in  the  way  that  it  does.  This  
becomes  particularly  relevant  when  examining  the  political  movements  within  
non-democracies,  and  the  way  security  and  resources  are  treated  in  that  environment.  
Ultimately,  through  mechanisms  such  as  these  that  affect  the  preponderance  of  conflict,  regime  
characteristics  can  affect  both  the  beginning  and  the  duration  of  an  ethnic  conflict. 
39  Posen,  “The  Security  Dilemma  and  Ethnic  Conflict”,  27-9. 
40  Young,  “The  Heart  of  the  African  Conflict  Zone”,  311. 
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Chapter  2   
Ethnicity  and  Regime  Type  
 
Introduction 
While  the  study  of  ethnic  conflict  was  booming  in  one  area  of  political  science,  a  
simultaneous  wave  of  study  was  happening  concerning  regime  types.  Since  the  end  of  the  Cold  
War,  not  only  was  the  overall  trend  of  conflict  overwhelmingly  tending  towards  civil  war  as  
opposed  to  interstate  conflict,  but  the  “Third  Wave”  of  democratization  was  throwing  countries  
into  upheaval.   A  consequence  of  the  movement  towards  relative  democratization  was  a  slew  of  41
regimes  with  some  semblance  of  democracy  but  largely  retaining  an  autocratic  character;  
institutions  typically  seen  in  democracies  on  the  surface  allowed  countries  with  non-democratic  
regimes  to  secure  support  and  resources  from  more  consolidated,  wealthier  democracies.  42
Ultimately,  measures  of  internal  repression,  civil  liberties,  and  leadership  selection  combined  
with  measures  of  political  freedom  and  fairness  define  regime  type  and  behavior  for  a  given  
nation,  with  the  existence  of  consolidated  democracies,  consolidated  autocracies,  and  everything  
in  between.  43
While  institutions  common  to  democracies  are  also  seen  within  non-democracies,  such  
as  a  party  system  or  a  legislature,  their  execution  in  practice  is  different  and  can  result  in  a  more  
volatile  political  environment.   As  seen  in  Chapter  1,  ethnicity  is  a  powerful  tool  to  use  for  44
political  means;  through  continued  study  of  regime  behavior,  it  can  be  predicted  where  and  how  
ethnicity  will  arise  as  a  force,  and  therefore  where  ethnic  conflict  is  bound  to  occur.  Among  these  
41  Huntington,  “Democracy’s  Third  Wave”,  12-16. 
42  Levitsky  and  Way,  Competitive  Authoritarianism:  Hybrid  Regimes  after  the  Cold  War ,  20. 
43  Marshall  et  al.,   “Polity  IV  Project:  Political  Regime  Characteristics  and  Transitions,  1800-2018.” 
44  Hegre  et  al.,  “Toward  a  Democratic  Civil  Peace?  Democracy,  Political  Change,  and  Civil  War,  1816-1992”,  34. 
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regime  types,  conflict  variation  has  already  become  evident  to  some  degree,  which  implies  that  
regime  type  can  affect  the  prevalence  of  ethnic  conflict.  The  question  then  lies  in  what  aspect  of  
regime  variation  among  non-democracies  can  truly  affect  change.   
In  this  chapter,  I  will  explore  regime  type  and  characteristics  as  the  explanatory  factors  
of  interest  for  ethnic  conflict.  I  will  examine  first  the  science  of  measuring  regime  variation,  
which  has  undergone  significant  development  in  recent  years  but  has  maintained  key  underlying  
characteristics.  There  exists  a  tight  relationship  between  quantifying  regime  types  and  their  
analysis  in  relation  to  outcomes  like  conflict  in  literature,  so  this  development  is  explored  
thoroughly.  I  will  make  an  argument  for  the  definition  of  regime  type  through  regime  
characteristics  as  opposed  to  broader  regime  type,  which  I  believe  to  be  relatively  unhelpful  in  
determining  a  causal  relationship,  yet  valuable  to  re-test  in  this  setting.  I  will  then  examine  two  
relevant  regime  characteristics  which  I  believe  to  be  important  to  the  different  levels  of  ethnic  
conflict  seen,  which  are  the  party  system  and  the  level  of  military  involvement  in  government.  
Finally,  I  will  set  the  stage  for  my  experimental  analysis  of  variation  in  occurrence  and  levels  of  
ethnic  conflict  as  a  result  of  regime  variation.  
Institutions  and  Differences  in  Regimes 
To  understand  regime  variation  in  the  post-Cold  War  era,  some  foundational  theory  will  
prove  useful.  A  regime  is  the  combination  of  institutions  and  rules  that  dictate  access  to  public  
office  and  that  regulate  the  ascension  and  behavior  of  actors  in  the  political  arena.  A  regime  
therefore  encompasses  individual  administrations  or  forms  of  government,  and  a  change  in  
leadership  by  itself  does  not  lead  to  regime  change.   A  regime  is  a  system  of  governance,  and  45
dictates  the  relationship  between  political  leaders,  elites,  and  their  constituencies,  the  mass  
population  of  the  country.  Regime  change  occurs  only  when  these  institutions  and  rules  are  
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fundamentally  challenged  and  altered.  Democracies  are  regimes  in  which  “rulers  are  held  
accountable  for  their  actions...by  citizens,  acting  indirectly  through  the  competition  and  
cooperation  of  their  elected  representatives,”  and  those  in  which  political  and  civil  liberties  are  
granted  to  citizens.  Non-democracies  can  then  be  defined  as  regimes  in  which  one  or  more  of  
these  conditions  are  broken,  with  traditional  autocracies  expected  to  fulfil  nearly  none  of  these  
conditions.   46
The  implementation  of  particular  institutions  within  non-democratic  regimes  grant  each  
a  sort  of  character.  It  is  important  to  recognize  that  institutions,  in  and  of  themselves,  cannot  be  
categorized  as  “democratic”  or  “autocratic”.  However,  although  the  unfettered  operation  of  
certain  institutions  is  critical  to  the  foundation  of  democracy,  their  existence  within  a  
non-democracy  can  in  fact  strengthen  the  legitimacy  and  reach  of  the  regime.   The  peculiar  47
juxtaposition  of  institutions  meant  to  ensure  accountability  with  elites  who  desire  greater  
control  in  a  non-democracy  means  that  institutions  within  non-democracies  behave  differently  
than  their  counterparts  in  democracies,  despite  in  name  being  similar;  incremental  democratic  
backsliding  proves  that  non-democracies  can  appear  to  operate  like  democracies  on  the  surface. 
  Because  the  operation  of  institutions  in  non-democracies  is  influenced  by  the  agenda  of  48
groups  in  power,  they  can  serve  as  the  origins  for  ethnic  conflict  because  they  are  the  proverbial  
battlefield  for  competing  political  interests,  which  in  ethnically  divided  regimes  are  often  
centered  around  ethnicity.   
Variation  in  non-democratic  regimes  can  be  broad,  encapsulating  the  ‘character’  of  
institutions  along  with  the  general  nature  of  the  regime,  or  specifically  examining  the  differences  
within  each  particular  institution.  Both  methods  are  useful  to  understand  the  roots  of  ethnic  
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conflict  in  non-democracies,  but  the  differences  in  implementation  of  institutions  traditional  to  
democracies  can  make  a  difference  in  conflict  outcomes.  In  the  hypotheses  presented  below,  
these  perspectives  are  tested.   
Regime  Type  and  Ethnic  Conflict  
History  provides  a  specific  context  for  regime  types  and  change  in  the  modern  world.  
Neorealism  purports  that  the  Cold  War  caused  a  bipolar  power  balance,  within  which  political  
ideology  among  other  things  was  in  flux.   The  USA  and  USSR  sought  to  increase  their  ‘spheres  49
of  influence’  during  this  period,  and  one  of  the  consequences  of  this  expansion  was  pressure  
towards  respective  allies.   The  capitalist-communist  ideological  battle  gave  way  to  a  push  for  50
democratization;  after  the  fall  of  the  USSR,  democratizing  pressure  increased  from  consolidated  
Western  democracies.  Far  from  having  a  direct  impact  in  increasing  the  number  of  democracies  
in  the  world,  a  side  effect  was  the  creation  of  regimes  that  retained  much  of  their  autocratic  
character  yet  bore  democratic  institutions  on  the  surface,  motivated  by  mechanisms  like  linkage  
and  leverage.   This  “Third  Wave”  of  democratization  meant  that  regimes  were  growing  more  51
varied,  and  new  global  balances  were  emerging.  52
Early  literature  on  regime  classification  after  the  Cold  War  postulated  the  existence  of  
consolidated,  strong  democracies  and  autocracies,  but  noted  that  there  existed  a  middle  
category  of  hybrid  regimes  that  had  some  appearance  of  democracy  but  demonstrated  autocratic  
character  in  institutional  implementation.  Terms  for  this  phenomenon  abounded,  the  most  
common  being  anocracy ,  semi-democracy ,  partly-free  states ,  and  hybrid  regimes .  The  first  
studies  categorizing  regimes  were  mainly  concerned  with  broad  descriptions  of  ‘freedom’,  based  
on  sub-classification  of  civil  liberties  and  political  rights  measures.  Some  studies,  like  Fein  
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(1995),  classified  regimes  categorically  as  ‘not  free’,  ‘partly  free’,  or  ‘free’.   Importantly,  the  53
methods  of  measurement  of  regime  type  and  the  categorization  of  regimes  are  interrelated,  and  
are  analyzed  as  such  for  the  rest  of  this  chapter.  In  this  decade  of  exploration,  measures  of  
freedom,  openness,  and  repression  dominated  the  literature  on  regime  type.  
Later  literature  expanded  on  this  designation,  and  this  development  was  echoed  back  by  
advancement  in  measurement  methods  by  dataset  creators.  The  Polity  family  of  datasets  was  
used  extensively  in  the  following  decade  in  international  relations  literature,  and  it  provided  a  
continuous  scale  for  regime  measurement,  creating  an  aggregate  score  from  a  combination  of  
measures  of  democracy  and  autocracy.  Individual  aspects  contributing  to  these  measures  build  
on  the  concept  of  freedom  through  provision  of  civil  liberties  and  rights,  but  add  analysis  of  
traditional  checks  and  balances  and  constraints  on  executive  power.   With  a  more  detailed  54
scale,  correspondingly  greater  analysis  could  be  done  on  regimes  “mix[ing]  democratic  and  
autocratic  features”,  termed  anocracy .  Some  studies  created  three  separate  buckets  from  this  
data,  and  others  allowed  the  mid-range  regimes  to  continue  on  a  continuous  scale.  55
As  a  result  of  this  strong  middle  designation,  parallel  studies  emerged  examining  conflict  
patterns  within  hybrid  regimes  as  compared  to  more  established  autocracies  and  democracies.  
Studies  found  that  both  repression   and  civil  conflict   were  greater  in  regimes  in  the  middle  56 57
(“anocracy”  or  “partly  free”)  as  opposed  to  either  strong  autocracies  or  strong  democracies,  
suggesting  a  connection  between  the  mixed  character  of  anocracy  and  the  preponderance  of  
conflict.  This  “U-shape”  finding  was  theorized  to  be  the  result  of  several  characteristics  innate  to  
a  hybrid  regime  type.  The  partly-open  or  partly-free  nature  of  regimes  in  the  middle  opens  up  
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the  “possibility  of  greater  class  and  group  conflict”,  which  means  “challengers...may  resort  to  
violence”  as  a  viable  way  to  change  the  existing  order  through  mobilization.   Within  later  58
research,  regimes  in  the  middle  seem  to  mix  “mass  politics...with  authoritarian  elite  politics  in  a  
volatile  way”,  leading  to  a  greater  level  of  civil  conflict  than  either  democracies  on  one  end  of  the  
spectrum  or  autocracies  on  the  other  end.  59
Ethnic  conflict  as  discussed  previously  is  influenced  by  many  of  the  same  traits  that  
increase  the  likelihood  of  civil  conflict  within  middle  regimes.  As  mentioned  in  Chapter  1,  
ethnonationalism  can  be  a  conduit  for  mass  mobilization  for  change,  especially  if  politics  at  the  
power  center  exclude  or  disadvantage  certain  groups.  In  these  mid-regimes,  theoretically  
conflict  can  be  induced  through  mobilization  when  violence  is  the  only  mechanism  for  change.  
Institutions  that  are  susceptible  to  manipulation  in  such  regimes  can  be  sources  for  ethnic  
tensions  over  an  uneven  distribution  of  power,  and  therefore  serve  as  arenas  for  conflict  
origination.   Furthermore,  findings  suggest  that  a  self-sustaining  cycle  of  violence  can  occur;  60
where  ethnic  conflict  has  occurred  before,  it  is  more  likely  to  occur  again.   Extending  these  61
findings  to  variation  among  non-democracies,  a  simple  prediction  can  be  made:  ethnic  conflict  
as  a  subset  of  civil  conflict  can  be  expected  to  occur  in  anocracies  with  greater  likelihood  than  in  
autocracies,  under  similar  conditions  as  were  imposed  in  preceding  literature.  This  yields  the  
first  hypothesis:   
H1.  Anocracies  will  have  an  increased  likelihood  of  ethnic  conflict  compared  to  autocracies. 
Interestingly,  not  many,  if  any  studies  at  all,  measure  the  effect  of  regime  type  on  the  
level  of  civil  conflict.  Because  this  project  aims  to  quantify  this  effect  as  well,  an  extension  of  the  
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above  theory  suggests  that  mass  mobilization  combined  with  volatility  and  increased  patterns  of  
repression  by  elites  would  indicate  that  higher  levels  of  ethnic  conflict  could  be  expected  from  
regimes  in  the  middle.  This  gives  rise  to  the  second  hypothesis: 
H2.  Anocracies  will  have  increased  levels  of  ethnic  conflict  compared  to  autocracies.  
These  hypotheses  re-test  initial  findings  on  civil  conflict  patterns  across  regime  type  with  
respect  to   ethnic  conflict  specifically,  as  opposed  to  broad  civil  conflict,  and  extend  the  test  to  
levels  of  ethnic  conflict  as  well.   
However,  this  subset  of  literature  (especially  those  that  use  Polity  IV’s  composite  
measure  to  segment  regimes)  is  not  without  its  criticisms.  The  first  of  these  criticisms  regards  
the  measurement  used  in  many  of  these  studies.  Vreeland  (2008)  criticizes  one  specific  factional  
subscore  making  up  the  Polity  composite  score,  noting  that  using  the  composite  score  to  
measure  onset  is  tautological  given  that  the  coding  rules  for  that  subscore  include  the  
occurrence  of  civil  unrest  or  conflict  during  that  time  period.   A  second  criticism  of  this  62
literature  is  more  theoretical  in  nature.  The  term  ‘anocracy’  is  a  broad  term  encompassing  many  
regimes  that  do  not  neatly  fit  into  the  democratic  or  autocratic  spheres,  and  many  studies  use  
the  middle-scoring  countries  within  regime  datasets  to  define  this.  As  a  result,  this  is  less  than  
helpful  to  determine  what  exactly  about  such  regimes  lends  them  to  greater  conflict.  The  
hypotheses  proposed  above  are  purposefully  vague,  to  demonstrate  that  many  aspects  of  the  
regime  can  affect  occurrence  and  levels  of  ethnic  conflict  simultaneously.  While  these  are  valid  
criticisms  of  this  particular  approach,  retesting  ethnic  conflict  as  the  outcome  specifically  and  
recreating  these  methods  will  be  valuable  to  compare  with  the  changes  in  testing  specific  regime  
characteristics.  Not  only  will  trends  between  this  subset  of  studies  be  comparable  for  the  first  
62  Vreeland,  “The  Effect  of  Political  Regime  on  Civil  War”,  401-25. 
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time  through  the  utilization  of  multiple  methods,  but  the  merit  of  classifying  a  regime  in  a  
general  way  will  be  compared  to  the  value  of  examining  independent  institutional  behavior  
within  that  same  regime.  
Regime  Characteristics  and  Ethnic  Conflict 
Another  movement  within  the  literature  has  aimed  to  categorize  regimes  based  on  their  
characteristics  or  factors,  and  while  several  factors  are  emphasized  in  most  work  as  important,  
in  practice  they  are  executed  differently.  Geddes  (1999)  segments  authoritarian  regime  types  not  
based  on  the  level  of  democratic  or  autocratic  character  seen,  but  rather  how  factions  within  the  
government  interact  and  their  control  of  the  executive  position.  This  approach  “emphasize[s]  
control  over  access  to  power...rather  than  formal  institutional  characteristics”,  which  allows  the  
segmentation  of  regime  types  based  on  the  particular  combination  of  actors  with  power.  63
Several  different  types  are  possible  under  this  model;  a  military  regime,  a  personalist  regime,  a  
single-party  regime,  or  a  combination  of  two  types.  Under  such  a  model,  the  specific  character  of  
the  regime  would  determine  risk  factors  that  exacerbate  ethnic  conflict,  rather  than  a  vague  
classification  as  a  ‘consolidated’  regime  or  a  hybrid  regime.  However,  this  model  incorporates  
seemingly  small  concepts  into  its  definition  of  regime  type,  when  in  reality  the  regime  can  be  far  
more  varied.  Svolik  (2012)  utilizes  a  more  elegant  and  exhaustive  approach,  arguing  that  
military  classifications  and  party  classifications,  for  instance,  are  more  varied  than  Geddes  
suggests  and  exist  on  different  ‘axes’,  meaning  a  multi-party  regime  with  military  involvement  
would  be  possible  as  a  classification  where  it  was  not  previously.   Ultimately,  however,  both  64
studies  find  importance  in  key  factors  such  as  these  when  defining  the  character  of  a  regime.  
Svolik  creates  a  detailed  classification  for  authoritarian  regimes,  using  a  typology  with  
four  different  categories  affecting  politics  in  non-democracies,  including  military  involvement  in  
63  Geddes,  “What  Do  We  Know  About  Democratization  After  Twenty  Years?”,  123. 
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politics,  party  system,  the  system  of  executive  selection,  and  the  system  of  legislative  selection.  
Party  system  classifications  and  level  of  military  involvement  in  particular  are  of  interest  when  
considering  effects  on  occurrence  and  levels  of  ethnic  conflict.  A  non-democracy  can  have  no  
parties,  a  single  party,  or  multiple  parties  that  are  allowed  to  compete  in  the  electoral  process;  as  
a  result  of  this  variation  in  competition,  the  strategies  surrounding  the  acquisition  of  
constituencies  changes,  which  can  change  conflict  outcomes.  A  high  level  of  military  
involvement  can  change  incentives  for  acquiring  power,  and  has  been  known  to  increase  the  
likelihood  of  interstate  conflict;  there  is  a  possibility  that  this  effect  extends  to  civil  conflict,  and  
therefore  ethnic  conflict,  as  well.   In  the  following  sections,  I  expand  on  these  two  factors  within  65
an  autocracy,  the  knowledge  about  them  to  date,  and  their  potential  effects  on  ethnic  conflict.  
While  Svolik’s  classification  is  preferred  methodologically,  Geddes  and  many  other  scholars  
offer  sound  theory  that  is  incorporated.  
Party  Systems  and  Ethnic  Conflict  
The  ideals  of  democracy  include  the  ability  to  openly  contest  in  elections  and  access  to  
power  granted  at  the  behest  of  the  people  of  a  nation.  Many  non-democracies  have  formal  
parties  that  are  allowed  to  contest,  but  the  competition  does  not  have  a  fair  chance  at  winning  
office  or  does  not  have  a  chance  at  all.  From  Svolik’s  theory,  party  systems  for  the  election  of  an  
executive  exist  on  an  axis  within  a  regime  that  can  then  be  used  to  define  that  regime;  I  theorize  
that  this  variation  can  then  have  an  effect  on  differences  in  ethnic  conflict  across  
non-democracies.   The  particular  classification  is  inspired  from  Geddes’  work,  where  66
single-party  regimes  are  those  which  ban  any  form  of  opposition  or  repress  it  to  the  extent  that  
any  other  parties  are  effectively  rendered  ineffective.   The  existence  of  multiple  parties  within  a  67
65  Weeks,  “Strongmen  and  Straw  Men”,  326-27. 
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non-democracy  is  more  interesting,  and  more  nuanced  in  its  theory;  it  is  peculiar  for  a  
non-democracy  to  have  multiple  parties  when  electoral  freedom  does  not  usually  exist,  so  they  
must  serve  a  particular  purpose.  
Competitive  authoritarian  regimes  are  regimes  in  which  regular  elections  occur  with  
multiple  parties,  but  competition  is  uneven  and  unfair.  Levitsky  and  Way  (2010)  explain  that  
democratizing  pressure  after  the  end  of  the  Cold  War  focused  on  emphasizing  certain  
institutions  as  the  hallmarks  of  democracy,  such  as  the  existence  of  elections  for  the  executive.  
While  this  pressure  seemed  to  be  outwardly  successful,  what  emerged  was  a  particular  subset  of  
the  hybrid  regimes  previously  mentioned:  those  who  incorporated  such  institutions  as  a  method  
of  securing  support  from  wealthier,  older  democracies  in  the  West.   Many  existing  autocrats  68
were  able  to  liberalize  their  governments  partially,  without  any  real  effort  to  democratize.  
Competitive  authoritarianism  opened  up  a  new  world  of  regime  subtypes,  and  a  pattern  
emerged.  Within  such  regimes,  an  “inherent  tension”  was  created  with  the  existence  of  legal  
arenas  for  political  competition,  where  incumbents  could  be  challenged  regularly  and  where  
mass  mobilization  would  be  encouraged.   A  particular  benefit  exists  in  the  form  of  resource  69
patronage  for  the  victorious  in-group,  raising  the  stakes  of  any  existing  elections.  70
On  the  other  hand,  while  such  measures  might  have  proved  advantageous  for  elites  in  
these  regimes  in  one  regard,  in  practice  elections,  and  the  incorporation  of  rival  elites  within  
government,  can  prove  quite  risky  to  the  status  quo.  The  coup-civil  war  trap  is  a  well-noted  
phenomenon:  when  rival  elites  are  incorporated,  the  regime  is  more  unstable  and  prone  to  
conflict,  but  the  absence  of  their  incorporation  risks  civil  conflict  as  rival  elites  attempt  to  seize  
power.   In  terms  of  variance  in  party  systems,  multiple  parties  can  offer  the  risk  of  71
68  Levitsky  and  Way,  Competitive  Authoritarianism:  Hybrid  Regimes  after  the  Cold  War,  19. 
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incorporation,  which  would  potentially  increase  the  likelihood  of  ethnic  conflict  within  such  
regimes.  It  is  possible  that  regimes  with  any  opening  for  rival  elites  to  create  constituencies  and  
seize  power  run  the  risk  of  an  increased  chance  of  conflict.  
Furthermore,  in  an  electoral  non-democratic  regime,  the  motives  for  emphasizing  ethnic  
divisions  to  create  constituencies  would  increase.  For  elites  from  a  majority  ethnic  group,  
stirring  ethnonationalism  would  allow  the  solidification  of  existing  constituencies  along  such  
lines,  decreasing  the  threat  offered  by  elections.  Ethnic  minority  leaders  who  seek  office  are  then  
prompted  to  run  along  similar  lines  or  risk  losing  existing  voters.  Additionally,  regimes  which  
have  surface-level  elections  without  actual  change  risk  the  power  dynamic  described  by  
Cederman  et  al.  (2010),  who  find  that  ethnic  groups  excluded  from  the  power  center  are  more  
likely  to  engage  in  conflict  with  the  government.   With  the  deepening  of  ethnic  divisions,  civil  72
conflict  that  erupts  is  more  likely  to  be  along  ethnic  lines,  and  conflict  overall  becomes  more  
likely  through  competing  ethnonationalist  claims  to  power.   Another  study  from  Davenport  73
(2007)  finds  that  overall  repression  within  regimes  with  single-parties  is  lower  than  other  
regime  types,  suggesting  that  a  “tyrannical  peace”  is  achievable  and  that  not  every  authoritarian  
regime  is  as  likely  to  have  internal  conflict.   Finally,  resource  control  is  a  main  motivator  for  74
ethnic  conflict,  and  the  patronage  employed  by  autocrats  for  their  in-groups  is  but  an  extension  
of  this  concept.   From  this  set  of  findings,  a  third  hypothesis  can  be  drawn: 75
H3.  Non-democracies  with  multiple  parties  will  have  an  increased  likelihood  of  ethnic  conflict  
compared  to  those  with  one  or  no  party.  
72  Cederman,  Wimmer,  and  Min,  “Why  Do  Ethnic  Groups  Rebel?”,  88. 
73  Gagnon,  “Ethnic  Nationalism  and  International  Conflict”,  136. 
74  Davenport,  “State  Repression  and  the  Tyrannical  Peace”,  485. 
75  Walter,  “Does  Conflict  Beget  Conflict?”,  372. 
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Mass  mobilization  is  key  to  the  onset  of  conflict  within  competitive  authoritarian  
regimes,  because  there  are  motives  for  elites  to  encourage  mobilization  along  ethnic  lines.  As  a  
result,  the  level  of  ethnic  conflict  can  be  expected  to  be  higher  where  such  motivations  exist,  
because  more  people  are  affected,  leading  to  longer  and  harsher  conflict.  A  fourth  hypothesis  
draws  from  this  concept: 
H4.  Non-democracies  with  multiple  parties  will  have  increased  levels  of  ethnic  conflict  
compared  to  those  with  one  or  no  party. 
Military  Involvement  and  Ethnic  Conflict  
One  particular  area  of  interest  is  the  military’s  involvement-  outside  of  national  security  
affairs-  in  the  executive.  Entire  regimes  can  be  classified  as  military  regimes  or  military  hybrid  
regimes  under  the  system  proposed  by  Geddes  (1999).   While  the  military  can  be  involved  in  a  76
regime  to  the  extent  where  it  takes  on  an  overall  militaristic  character,  this  exists  on  a  separate  
axis  from  party  systems  as  explained  by  Svolik  (2012).   Regardless,  regimes  with  high  levels  of  77
military  involvement  tend  to  view  force  as  a  means  to  solving  external  regime  problems.  This  is  
the  consequence  of  both  the  organizational  structure  innate  to  a  military,  but  also  a  movement  
to  prove  necessity  to  the  regime.   It  is  possible  that  this  can  create  a  similar  viewpoint  towards  78
resolving  internal  threats.  
The  military  in  a  non-democracy  can  get  involved  in  the  political  arena  in  ways  that  
would  not  be  possible  under  the  institutions  and  checks  of  a  democracy.  This  involvement  has  
implications  for  conflict  outcomes  as  a  result,  because  the  military  has  a  particular  set  of  
motivations  and  behaviors  that  influences  its  members.  Political  factions  within  the  military  are  
76  Geddes,  “What  Do  We  Know  About  Democratization  After  Twenty  Years?”,  123. 
77  Milan  W.  Svolik,  The  Politics  of  Authoritarian  Rule ,  31. 
78  Weeks,  “Strongmen  and  Straw  Men”,  343. 
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far  less  likely  to  cooperate  than  that  within  regular  civilian  elites,  and  with  violence  being  the  
modus  operandi  of  resolving  such  disputes,  conflict  within  the  country  becomes  more  likely  as  
conflict  within  factions  becomes  more  likely.    Furthermore,  repression  is  often  carried  out  79
within  non-democracies  by  the  military,  which  means  that  repressive  behavior  itself,  and  civil  
conflict  stemming  from  it,  are  more  likely  and  occur  on  a  greater  scale.   Ethnicity  can  be  used  80
for  the  development  of  support  for  elite  military  factions  among  the  population,  and  it  can  fulfill  
the  other  aspect  that  encourages  mobilization:  targeting  ‘scapegoats’,  seeming  outsiders  who  
would  be  threats  to  the  regime  and  to  important  ethnic  groups.   Ethnic  conflict  as  a  subset  of  81
civil  conflict  would  be  expected  to  behave  similarly  in  relation  with  the  level  of  military  
involvement  in  politics,  which  gives  rise  to  the  hypothesis: 
H5.  Non-democracies  with  a  military  involved  in  politics  will  have  an  increased  likelihood  of  
ethnic  conflict  compared  to  those  without  military  involvement. 
A  characteristic  of  regimes  with  high  military  involvement  includes  the  increased  ability  
to  supply  groups  with  weaponry  and  training,  due  to  a  closely  integrated  supply  process.  The  
capacity  to  quickly  supply  militias  and  direct  their  actions  has  been  a  clear  cause  of  several  
genocides,  resulting  in  a  high  number  of  casualties.   This,  combined  with  the  general  pattern  of  82
increased  repression  in  militaristic  regimes,  leads  to  the  final  hypothesis: 
H6.  Non-democracies  with  a  military  involved  in  politics  will  have  increased  levels  of  ethnic  
conflict  compared  to  those  without  military  involvement. 
The  six  hypotheses  proposed  above  will  be  tested  in  the  coming  chapters.  
79  Geddes,  “What  Do  We  Know  About  Democratization  After  Twenty  Years?”,  124. 
80  Davenport,  “State  Repression  and  the  Tyrannical  Peace”,  486. 
81  Young,  “The  Heart  of  the  African  Conflict  Zone”,  311. 
82  Stanton,  Dr.  Gregory  G.  “The  Ten  Stages  of  Genocide”. 
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Chapter  3   
Methodology  
 
Introduction 
In  this  chapter,  I  will  review  my  methods  and  detail  my  empirical  approach  to  testing  my  
hypotheses.  To  summarize  past  chapters,  I  am  interested  in  the  effect  regime  type  has  both  on  
the  occurrence  of  ethnic  conflict  and  the  level  of  ethnic  conflict  seen.  I  first  begin  my  analysis  
from  an  onset  perspective,  recreating  for  ethnic  conflict  what  previous  studies  have  examined  
only  for  civil  conflict.  I  then  test  the  effect  of  regime  type  and  regime  characteristics  on  levels  of  
ethnic  conflict,  which  I  operationalize  as  the  level  of  casualties  seen  at  a  country-year  level.  I  will  
review  the  kind  of  study  I  undertook,  my  data  collection  measures,  and  my  treatment  of  the  
variables  involved.  I  will  then  talk  about  my  method  of  analysis  and  the  models  I  created,  
finishing  with  some  notes  on  the  process  as  a  whole.  
Hypotheses  
First,  I  review  my  hypotheses  and  the  simple  relationship  expected  below.  For  a  list  of  
the  formal  hypotheses  and  accompanying  measures,  please  see  the  hypothesis  table  attached  in  
Appendix  C.  
_____  
H1.  Anocracies  will  have  an  increased  likelihood  of  ethnic  conflict  compared  to  autocracies.  
H2.  Anocracies  will  have  increased  levels  of  ethnic  conflict  compared  to  autocracies.  
H3.  Non-democracies  with  multiple  parties  will  have  an  increased  likelihood  of  ethnic  conflict  
compared  to  those  with  one  or  no  party.  
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H4.  Non-democracies  with  more  than  one  party  will  have  increased  levels  of  ethnic  conflict  
compared  to  those  with  one  or  no  party.  
H5.  Non-democracies  with  a  military  involved  in  politics  will  have  an  increased  likelihood  of  
ethnic  conflict  compared  to  those  without  military  involvement.  
H6.  Non-democracies  with  a  military  involved  in  politics  will  have  increased  levels  of  ethnic  
conflict  compared  to  those  without  military  involvement.  
_____  
In  order  to  simplify  my  approach  to  the  research  question,  I  divided  my  study  along  
vertical  divisions  according  to  the  explanatory  variable  of  choice,  and  along  horizontal  divisions  
to  distinguish  between  likelihood  of  conflict  and  levels  of  conflict.  Going  forward  in  this  section,  
I  will  refer  to  the  hypotheses  by  their  number  for  shorthand.  Below,  I  demonstrate  these  
divisions  in  a  matrix,  which  will  become  important  when  deciding  what  the  models  for  testing  
these  hypotheses  will  be.  
Fig.  1:  Hypothesis  Matrix  and  Divisions 
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Research  Design 
In  this  study,  I  decided  to  undertake  a  large-N  study  with  quantitative  regression  
analysis,  aggregating  several  datasets  to  acquire  the  variables  I  wished  to  test  against  one  
another.  I  examine  cases  across  non-democracies  exclusively,  which  internally  vary  along  the  
vertical  divisions  specified  in  Fig.  1  above.  I  will  first  review  the  explanatory  variables  in  my  
vertical  divisions,  and  detail  their  measurement  and  the  way  I  chose  to  operationalize  them.  In  
my  vertical  divisions  as  explained  above,  I  am  primarily  interested  in  distinguishing  between  the  
“bucket”  regime  type  and  regime  variation  among  relevant  characteristics  that  I  believe  will  
impact  the  outcomes  of  ethnic  conflict.  I  believe  that  the  two  regime  characteristics  above  will  
yield  more  interesting  and  more  detailed  results  than  a  bucket  regime  type,  which  will  allow  for  
more  nuanced  analysis  of  the  research  question.   
In  previous  studies,  in  practice,  anocracies  have  been  distinguished  from  autocracies  
through  the  simple  expedient  of  using  the  Polity  IV  aggregate  measure  for  the  level  of  
democracy  present  in  a  given  country.  In  the  past,  anocracies  have  been  found  to  have  both  
higher  levels  of  repression  and  civil  conflict  using  this  method.   If  the  patterns  within  ethnic  8384
conflict  follow  the  patterns  seen  on  a  larger  scale  within  civil  conflict,  then  the  expectation  is  
that  this  division  will  prove  to  be  predictive  of  the  likelihood  of  ethnic  conflict  seen:  specifically,  
that  anocracies  will  be  more  likely  to  have  ethnic  conflict.   
Though  this  U-shape  hypothesis  in  civil  conflict  literature  predicts  that  repression  and  
civil  conflict  again  dips  when  countries  are  democracies,  this  is  not  addressed  within  this  
particular  research  question  focused  on  non-democracies.  Practically,  this  means  that  I  have  the  
luxury  of  predicting  a  linear  relationship:  from  autocracy  to  anocracy,  the  likelihood  of  ethnic  
83  Hegre  et  al.,  “Toward  a  Democratic  Civil  Peace?  Democracy,  Political  Change,  and  Civil  War,  1816-1992”,  33-48. 
84  Fearon  and  Laitin,  “Ethnicity,  Insurgency,  and  Civil  War”,  75-90. 
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conflict  increases.  This  is  the  subject  of  H1.  Through  describing  the  general  character  of  
anocracy  in  previous  chapters,  I  arrive  at  H2,  which  similarly  postulates  that  the  level  of  conflict  
seen  in  anocracy  will  be  higher,  because  the  partly-open  nature  of  such  regimes  will  encourage  
mobilization  without  sufficient  channels  for  political  participation,  and  will  promote  violence  as  
one  of  the  foremost  tools  for  change.  This  again  predicts  a  linear  relationship.  Due  to  the  way  I  
have  described  both  of  these  effects,  the  measure  of  this  variable  is  transformed  from  a  
numerical  score  to  a  binomial  variable;  either  a  regime  is  an  anocracy,  or  it  is  not  (it  would  be  an  
autocracy  otherwise).  
While  regime  type  by  definition  may  encompass  the  two  regime  characteristics  of  
interest  (party  system  and  level  of  military  involvement),  there  are  more  factors  included  that  
may  change  the  net  outcome  above.  In  looking  at  regime  factors,  I  first  examine  the  party  
system  of  the  regime  of  interest.  I  am  primarily  interested  in  the  difference  between  regimes  
without  parties/with  one  party,  and  regimes  with  multiple  parties.  Regimes  with  no  parties  and  
regimes  with  one  party  are  operationally  similar  in  the  way  they  would  affect  ethnic  conflict,  as  
the  existence  of  a  party  in  name  does  not  open  the  political  process  much  more  than  the  lack  of  
existence  of  parties.  In  this  way,  this  variable  becomes  a  binomial  variable  from  a  categorical  
one:  either  a  regime  allows  multiple  parties,  or  it  does  not.  The  relationship  with  likelihood  of  
ethnic  conflict  and  level  of  ethnic  conflict  is  predicted  to  be  direct:  if  a  regime  has  multiple  
parties,  it  is  more  likely  to  have  ethnic  conflict  and  has  ethnic  conflict  on  a  greater  scale.  These  
predictions  are  the  subject  of  H3  and  H4,  respectively.  
The  second  regime  factor  that  I  examine  is  the  level  of  military  involvement  in  political  
processes  and  the  executive  branch  within  a  regime.  Again,  in  this  situation  there  are  many  
potential  measures  for  the  involvement  of  the  military,  which  examined  by  themselves  would  
perhaps  offer  a  more  nuanced  perspective  on  whether  increasing  the  involvement  would  affect  
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ethnic  conflict.  However,  I  seek  to  answer  the  broader  question  of  whether  involvement  affects  
the  outcome  of  ethnic  conflict  at  all,  making  this  categorical  variable  a  binomial  one:  either  a  
regime  has  military  involvement  outside  of  national  security  affairs,  or  it  does  not.  I  also  predict  
a  positive  relationship  between  this  and  both  measures  of  outcome:  if  a  regime  has  military  
involvement  and  interference  in  the  political  arena,  it  is  both  more  likely  to  have  ethnic  conflict  
and  will  have  greater  levels  of  ethnic  conflict.  These  are  the  final  two  hypotheses,  H5  and  H6,  
respectively.  
Moving  towards  the  outcomes,  the  first  variable  I  am  interested  in  examining  as  
dependent  on  these  three  explanatory  variables  is  the  likelihood  of  ethnic  conflict,  also  
measured  as  the  ‘onset’  of  ethnic  conflict.  An  important  point  to  clarify  is  my  level  of  
aggregation,  which  is  at  the  country-year  level,  and  examines  conflict  at  that  level.  My  methods  
for  executing  this  half  of  the  study  is  based  on  previous  studies.  The  variable  itself  is  quite  
simple:  either  conflict  occurred  in  a  country-year  or  it  did  not,  making  it  a  binomial  response.  
However,  many  studies  lag  explanatory  variables  back  one  year  in  relation  to  the  occurrence  of  
conflict,  to  better  clarify  the  effects  of  factors  of  interest  and  to  avoid  reverse  causation.  This  is  a  
method  I  employ  as  well,  in  relation  to  the  conflict  binomial  variable.  This  is  straightforward  
enough,  although  the  method  of  regression  analysis  between  this  variable  and  the  three  
explanatory  variables  I  am  interested  in  is  different  than  for  the  other  outcome  variable  (I  will  
touch  on  this  in  a  later  section).  The  relationship  between  conflict  occurrence  and  the  
explanatory  variables  predicts  the  likelihood  of  conflict,  and  is  the  subject  of  H1,  H3,  and  H5  
respectively.  
The  second  outcome  I  am  interested  in,  and  which  is  original  to  this  study,  is  the  level  of  
ethnic  conflict  as  a  function  of  the  explanatory  variables.  This  variable  is  a  bit  more  difficult  to  
quantify  and  put  into  practice,  as  many  aspects  can  play  into  the  ‘scale’  of  conflict.  There  are  two  
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measures  that  are  decent  proxies  for  this  idea:  the  duration  of  ethnic  conflict,  and  the  casualties  
due  to  ethnic  conflict.  The  duration  of  conflict  is  useful  as  a  measure,  because  theoretically  it  can  
indicate  whether  multiple  parties  lead  to  longer  conflict,  or  if  military  involvement  leads  to  
longer  conflict.  This  is  a  description  of  peace  on  a  greater  scale,  and  it  describes  whether  causal  
regime  aspects  or  regime  types  can  predict  the  duration  of  fighting.  However,  there  are  a  
number  of  complications  in  using  this  as  a  measure.  The  way  in  which  the  war  ends,  or  the  
success  of  negotiations,  can  heavily  impact  it.  Instead  of  measuring  the  effects  from  regime  
characteristics,  some  aspects  of  the  resolution  of  conflict  can  affect  the  results.  Furthermore,  the  
duration  measure  and  the  effect  on  it  cannot  be  examined  at  the  country-year  level,  because  it  
spans  multiple  years;  the  preceding  years  to  the  conflict  only  could  be  examined,  which  becomes  
complex  when  more  than  one  conflict  is  occurring  in  a  country  at  a  given  time.  
I  explored  another  measure  of  the  level  of  conflict,  the  number  of  casualties,  as  an  
intriguing  way  to  think  about  the  scale  of  ethnic  conflict.  In  practice,  many  of  my  hypotheses  are  
based  on  studies  of  levels  of  repression  and  variance  in  civil  conflict  within  different  regime  
types,  which  would  indicate  perhaps  that,  in  regimes  where  mobilization  is  possible  but  violence  
is  high,  the  deaths  attributed  to  such  a  conflict  (both  battle  deaths  and  civilian  deaths)  would  be  
higher  as  the  conflict  was  more  widespread.  As  a  result,  a  higher  number  of  deaths  due  to  ethnic  
conflict  could  occur  in  an  anocracy  as  opposed  to  an  autocracy,  or  in  a  regime  with  multiple  
parties  as  opposed  to  one  party  or  less.  The  concept  would  be  to  explain  that,  in  such  regimes,  
conflict  can  touch  more  lives  and  cause  more  havoc  than  it  would  be  able  to  in  other  regimes.   
Casualties  as  a  measure  of  level  of  conflict  is  a  count  measure,  in  integers,  because  it  is  a  
count  of  the  number  of  deaths  attributed  to  conflict  at  the  country-year  level.  This  measure  has  
the  added  benefit  of  being  simpler  to  work  with  within  the  parameters  of  my  other  variables  and  
the  scope  of  my  question.  Since  this  is  a  measure  of  how  many  people  are  affected,  it  is  an  
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absolute  measure  and  one  that  I  decided  not  to  normalize  by  population  or  otherwise  adjust.  85
Regardless  of  the  population  of  the  country,  the  scale  of  conflict  as  measured  by  casualties  is  
absolute,  and  one  hundred  deaths  in  a  small  country  does  not  correlate  to  half  the  relative  loss  
in  a  larger  country,  but  rather  affects  just  as  many  lives.  There  are  two  measures  included  within  
the  total  conflict  number:  battle  deaths  and  civilian  deaths.  The  ideal  measure  of  conflict  
casualties  would  include  both  direct  and  indirect  deaths,  as  civilian  deaths  in  particular  are  
generally  higher  than  reported;  however,  indirect  deaths  are  difficult  to  quantify  reliably  and  so  
are  omitted  from  this  particular  model.   86
Finally,  I  decided  to  use  three  control  variables  in  my  study,  which  are  quite  common  in  
civil  conflict  models  and  which  I  believe  to  be  appropriate  for  this  as  well.  The  first  variable  I  
controlled  for  is  GDP  per  capita  as  a  measure  of  country  wealth,  and  the  second  is  the  
population  of  the  country.  Wealth  is  important,  and  affects  the  regime  type  and  to  a  certain  
extent  the  party  system  and  military  involvement  of  the  country  as  well,  as  a  result:  some  
literature  has  found  that  democracies  (and  the  trappings  of  democracy,  like  multiple  parties  and  
little  military  involvement)  tend  to  survive  more  in  wealthier  countries.   Wealth  also  affects  87
ethnic  conflict  outcomes,  as  poorer  countries  will  more  likely  experience  the  phenomenon  of  
civil  conflict  by  a  significant  amount:  I  have  extended  this  expected  effect  to  my  study  of  conflict  
casualty  variance  as  well.   In  terms  of  population,  the  likelihood  of  civil  conflict  occurring  in  88
larger  countries  increases  exponentially,  and  it  can  also  have  a  significant  impact  on  regime  type  
and  regime  factors;  I  extend  this  theory  to  the  level  of  conflict  as  well.   After  determining  these  89
85  There  is  precedent  for  using  both  relative  and  absolute  methods  of  measurement  when  measuring  casualties  of  
ethnic  conflict,  though  I  use  absolute  measurements:  see  the  Igarapé  Institute  report,  “Counting  Conflict  Deaths”,  for  
an  in-depth  discussion  of  casualty  data  collection  and  analysis  (pp.  5-13).  
86  Muggah,  “Counting  Conflict  Deaths:  Options  for  SDG  16.1”,  5-13. 
87  Epstein  et  al.,  “Democratic  Transitions”,  551-69. 
88  Fearon  and  Laitin,  “Ethnicity,  Insurgency,  and  Civil  War”,  75. 
89  Ibid.,  76. 
40  
two  variables  to  be  important  as  controls  in  my  models,  I  decided  to  log  them  in  practice  
because  both  variables  have  been  found  to  have  exponential  impacts  on  conflict  odds  with  
similar  marginal  changes.   
The  third  variable  I  controlled  for  was  the  number  of  ethnic  groups  present  in  the  
country.  The  primary  theoretical  reason  for  this  inclusion  was  the  idea  that  ethnic  conflict  as  
defined  and  described  earlier  could  be  more  possible  in  a  setting  with  a  greater  number  of  ethnic  
groups.  Since  ethnic  conflict  occurs  when  ethnicity  becomes  a  salient  cleavage  in  society,  along  
which  tensions  can  form,  there  would  potentially  be  more  opportunities  for  this  to  occur  with  a  
higher  number  of  groups.  In  practice,  I  found  this  variable  to  be  correlated  to  a  certain  degree  
with  the  population  control  variable;  higher  populations  are  correlated  with  a  higher  number  of  
ethnic  groups,  which  can  be  expected.  However,  because  both  are  control  variables  and  neither  
is  an  explanatory  variable  of  interest,  multicollinearity  is  not  a  concern.  This  variable  was  
treated  similarly  to  population  and  GDP,  and  logged.  90
Data  Collection 
The  beginning  stages  of  data  aggregation  necessitated  a  frame  within  which  relevant  data  
could  be  placed.  An  important  point  to  note  is  that  the  study  of  the  occurrence  of  ethnic  conflict  
would  need  all  country-years  within  the  period  of  interest,  and  the  study  of  the  level  of  ethnic  
conflict  would  only  need  country-years  with  conflict  within  the  period  of  interest.  This  
distinction  comes  from  the  questions  asked  about  conflict.  First,  within  H1-3-5,  the  question  is  
whether  a  certain  aspect  makes  ethnic  conflict  in  the  following  year  likely  or  not.  This  
necessitates  comparisons  to  years  where  there  is  no  ethnic  conflict;  hence,  all  country-years  
within  my  time  period  are  necessary.  In  H2-4-6,  among  the  years  with  conflict,  the  question  is  
90  The  distribution  of  groups  is  skewed  heavily  right,  so  to  normalize  this  distribution  and  improve  linearity,  
log(group)  is  used  within  the  model.  Because  of  this  measurement,  countries  marked  with  0  ethnic  groups  were  
treated  as  countries  marked  to  have  1  ethnic  group,  indicating  a  homogenous  population.  
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what  can  affect  the  level  of  casualties  seen,  which  requires  solely  those  country-years  in  which  
there  is  ethnic  conflict.   
Excel  was  the  primary  tool  used  for  dataset  construction.  First,  ethnic  conflict  
country-years  were  aggregated  from  the  Ethnic  Armed  Conflict  dataset.   Because  the  scope  of  91
the  question  is  post-Cold  War,  the  lower  time  limit  was  set  to  1990.  This  scope  was  chosen  
because  of  the  particular  interest  in  describing  ethnic  conflict  through  the  lens  of  civil  unrest  
and  regime  change  after  the  Cold  War  ended,  as  touched  on  previously.  Data  for  the  last  decade  
has  only  recently  become  available  and  is  being  published  currently,  so  the  time  period  is  more  
limited  than  would  be  preferred;  there  are  still  enough  samples  for  statistical  analysis,  so  this  is  
not  a  cause  for  concern.  The  Ethnic  Armed  Conflict  data  goes  through  2005,  which  was  set  as  
the  upper  limit,  making  the  sample  size  for  H  2-4-6  all  conflict  country-years  from  1990-2005.  A  
separate  dataset  was  created  containing  all  country-years  from  1990-2005  pulled  from  Polity  IV  
as  a  framework  for  H  1-3-5.   To  maintain  consistency  within  results,  this  time  period  was  used  92
across  every  dataset.  
After  setting  the  frames,  the  explanatory  variable  data  was  collected,  beginning  with  
anocracy  and  autocracy  regime  types.  Country-year  level  regime  type  data  was  added  from  
Polity  IV,  which  has  aggregate  scores  of  democracy.  Operationalizing  differences  between  
regime  types  can  be  difficult;  many  authors  use  composite  index  measures  like  this  one  to  group  
regimes  into  clear  buckets.  For  this  particular  explanatory  variable,  a  common  measure  was  
used  to  score  anocracy  and  autocracy.  This  was  later  re-coded  as  a  binomial  variable,  with  
anocracy  being  the  classification  of  interest.  To  reiterate,  this  particular  method  recreates  the  
subset  of  studies  that  observe  patterns  in  civil  conflict  and  repression  among  ‘anocracies’  by  
91  Cederman  et  al.,  “Ethnic  Armed  Conflict  dataset.” 
92  Marshall  et  al.,   “Polity  IV  Project:  Political  Regime  Characteristics  and  Transitions,  1800-2018.” 
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using  the  same  classifications  for  regime  types  as  compared  to  ethnic  conflict  country-years  and  
non-conflict  country-years.  93
For  the  two  regime  characteristics  of  interest,  I  decided  to  use  Svolik’s  “Institutions  in  
Dictatorships”  dataset,  which  records  various  regime  traits  and  institutions  among  
non-democracies.  Among  these,  there  are  country-year  level  measures  for  the  type  of  party  
system  within  the  regime  and  the  level  of  military  involvement.  Svolik’s  data  was  aggregated  in  a  
separate  set  which  focuses  specifically  on  the  party  system  and  level  of  military  involvement.  
Both  variables  began  as  categorical  measures,  but  as  explained  previously  were  more  useful  to  
the  analysis  as  binomial  variables,  and  were  also  recoded.  All  of  this  data  was  matched  to  the  
two  frames  created  previously  at  the  country-year  level:  however,  these  factors  were  lagged  by  
one  year  to  establish  the  causal  relationship  for  the  model.  There  are  some  edge  cases  that  Polity  
IV  and  Svolik  disagree  on  when  determining  democratic  or  non-democratic  character  for  a  
particular  country-year,  and  as  a  result  some  non-democratic  ethnic  armed  conflict  years  are  
different  between  the  two  datasets.  However,  the  small  number  of  different  cases  indicates  that  
this  is  not  overtly  significant  to  the  analysis.  94
The  two  outcome  variables  were  then  aggregated,  once  the  three  explanatory  variables  
were  added  to  the  datasets.  The  occurrence  of  conflict  within  a  given  year  was  pulled  from  the  
Ethnic  Armed  Conflict  dataset,  and  was  coded  as  a  binomial  variable.   The  casualties  attributed  95
to  conflict  were  taken  from  two  separate  sources.  The  first  measure  was  battle  deaths,  and  was  
aggregated  from  the  PRIO  dataset  at  the  country-year  level.   The  second  measure  was  civilian  96
deaths,  taken  from  the  Ethnic  One-Sided  Violence  dataset,  also  a  member  of  the  PRIO  family .  97
93  Please  see  Appendix  B  for  greater  detail  on  the  scores  used.  
94  For  greater  detail  on  the  specific  scores  and  re-scores  present  in  this  section,  please  see  Appendix  B.  
95  Cederman  et  al.,  “Ethnic  Armed  Conflict  dataset.” 
96  Gleditsch  et  al.,  “Armed  Conflict  1946-2001:  A  New  Dataset”,  v.  3-2005b 
97  Fjelde  et  al.,  “Introducing  the  Ethnic  One-Sided  Violence  dataset.” 
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The  sum  total  of  these  two  figures  yielded  a  total  casualty  count  per  country-year.  This  data  was  
then  matched  to  the  previous  data,  and  the  few  omitted  country-years  were  ignored  for  the  
purposes  of  the  model.  Both  of  these  outcome  variables  account  for  data  over  the  year,  and  are  
not  disaggregated  further  in  any  dataset  used.   
The  GDP  per  capita  and  population  data  for  every  country-year  were  added  from  the  
World  Bank  Data  family.  In  order  to  prevent  the  effect  of  ethnic  conflict  on  wealth  or  population  
from  entering  the  model,  figures  from  1989  were  used  consistently  for  each  country  regardless  
of  the  year,  providing  a  relative  measure  of  wealth  and  population.  The  time  period  is  a  
relatively  narrow  16  years,  so  this  adjustment  is  less  consequential.  Log-GDP  per  capita  and  
log-population  measures  were  created  and  incorporated  into  the  final  models.  Ethnic  group  data  
was  taken  from  the  “Ethnic  Power  Relations”  dataverse,  which  provides  the  number  of  
politically  relevant  ethnic  groups  present  in  a  country-year .  Some  country-years  were  not  98
present  within  the  full  dataset  for  H1-3-5,  and  those  country-years  were  omitted  from  the  
analysis.  All  data  for  the  limited  conflict  dataset  for  H  2-4-6  was  present.  Although  measures  of  
ethnic  fractionalization  are  also  present  in  this  dataset,  incorporation  would  be  outside  of  the  
scope  of  analysis;  this  extension  is  further  discussed  in  a  later  chapter.  The  log  of  this  variable  
was  included  within  each  of  the  final  models  to  improve  linearity.  
Ultimately,  four  separate  datasets  were  created,  from  which  six  models  were  drawn.   
Dataset  1  examines  the  effect  of  regime  type  on  the  likelihood  of  ethnic  conflict  (H1),  with  
regime  type,  conflict  occurrence,  and  the  three  logged  control  variables  present:  N  =  1181.   
Dataset  2  examines  the  effects  of  regime  factors  on  the  likelihood  of  ethnic  conflict  (H3  &  H5),  
with  party  system,  lagged  level  of  military  involvement,  conflict  occurrence,  and  the  three  logged  
control  variables  present:  N  =  896.   
98  Cederman  et  al.,  “Ethnic  Power  Relations  dataset.” 
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Dataset  3  tests  the  effect  of  regime  type  on  the  level  of  ethnic  conflict  during  conflict  years  (H2),  
with  regime  type,  conflict  casualties,  and  the  three  logged  control  variables  present:  N  =  330.   
Dataset  4  tests  the  effect  of  regime  factors  on  the  level  of  ethnic  conflict  during  conflict  years  
(H4  &  H6),  with  party  system,  lagged  level  of  military  involvement,  conflict  casualties,  and  the  
three  logged  control  variables  present:  N  =  237.  
An  important  note:  party  systems  and  level  of  military  involvement  are  not  included  within  the  
same  model  (despite  being  assembled  within  the  same  dataset)  because  they  exist  
fundamentally  on  different  axes  of  the  regime,  and  would  not  influence  one  another,  
Methods  of  Analysis 
Each  hypothesis  has  its  own  corresponding  model,  and  due  to  different  types  of  
measurement  for  dependent  variables,  has  different  regressions  as  well.  I  will  briefly  review  the  
models  and  the  decisions  made  for  analysis  methods:  the  model  number  corresponds  to  the  
hypothesis  going  forward  (H1  =  model  M1).  R  and  RStudio  were  the  tools  of  choice  for  
regression  analysis  on  the  data.  
M1  uses  Dataset  1,  and  is  similar  to  M3  and  M5  using  Dataset  2  in  the  regression  method  
employed.  Because  the  outcome  variable  of  interest,  conflict  occurrence,  is  binomial,  a  logistic  
regression  is  the  method  of  choice  when  assessing  a  relationship  between  it  and  the  three  
explanatory  variables.  M2  uses  Dataset  3,  and  is  also  similar  to  M4  and  M6  using  Dataset  4  in  
the  regression  method  utilized  as  well.  The  outcome  variable,  level  of  casualties  per  
country-year,  is  a  count  variable  and  thus  would  utilize  a  Poisson  or  a  negative  binomial  model.  
After  testing  the  casualty  data  for  overdispersion,  M2  was  fitted  to  a  Poisson  model  whereas,  for  
M4  and  M6,  a  negative  binomial  model  was  determined  to  be  the  better  method.  An  OLS  
regression  with  logged  casualty  count  data  would  also  be  a  possibility,  but  comes  with  
complications  and  does  not  give  an  accurate  portrayal  of  the  dispersion  of  the  data.  
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An  important  point  to  reiterate  is  that  M3  and  M5  are  kept  separate,  and  M2  and  M4  are  
kept  separate  as  well.  While  the  party  system  and  level  of  military  involvement  are  both  
characteristics  of  a  regime,  they  are  not  included  as  covariates  within  the  same  model.  Although  
some  literature  combines  the  two  characteristics  and  interlink  them,  the  idea  of  little  to  no  
interaction  between  the  two  as  separate  axes  of  a  regime  is  a  more  accurate  representation  of  
real-world  outcomes  as  argued  by  Svolik  (2012).   In  this  situation,  then,  they  have  little  99
influence  on  one  another  and  so  are  used  in  separate  models.  A  list  of  the  full  models  used  can  
be  found  in  Appendix  C,  along  with  relevant  method  details  and  regression  choices.  
 
 
   
99  Milan  W.  Svolik,  The  Politics  of  Authoritarian  Rule ,  2-25. 
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Chapter  4   
Analysis  and  Limitations  
 
 
Introduction 
Within  this  chapter,  I  have  included  a  set  of  regression  results  from  running  the  
aforementioned  models.  I  will  analyze  my  findings  and  explain  their  implications  for  the  
hypotheses,  whose  theoretical  extension  I  will  discuss.  I  will  then  identify  some  limitations  of  
the  study,  along  with  suggested  extensions  for  future  projects  building  from  this  work.  The  
standard  for  statistical  significance  across  every  model  is  set  at  a  95%  confidence  interval  (p  <  
0.05),  and  the  corresponding  significance  of  my  results  will  be  discussed  accordingly.  In  all  
tables  below,  ‘conflict’  denotes  ethnic  conflict  specifically,  the  subsets  of  which  are  specified  in  
Chapter  3;  all  conflict  results  are  specific  and  are  extended  to  ethnically  divided  regimes,  whose  
theory  is  expanded  upon  in  Chapter  1. 
Regressions  and  Analysis 
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Table  1  above  displays  the  total  effect  of  broad  regime  type  on  ethnic  conflict.  H1  
postulates  a  positive  relationship  between  anocracy  and  the  likelihood  of  ethnic  conflict,  based  
on  previous  studies  of  general  civil  conflict.  Model  M1  yields  a  statistically  significant  positive  
result  showing  that,  for  a  one-unit  increase  in  the  explanatory  variable  (regime  type),  the  log  
odds  of  conflict  occurrence  increase  by  0.403.  When  exponentiated  to  the  odds  ratio,  for  a  
one-unit  increase  in  regime  type,  the  odds  of  ethnic  conflict  occurring  increase  by  a  factor  of  
approximately  1.5:1.  There  is  only  one  possible  increment  in  regime  type,  which  is  the  change  
from  autocracy  to  anocracy.  These  two  categories  are  therefore  being  directly  compared  against  
one  another.  In  layman’s  terms,  it  is  more  likely  that  ethnic  conflict  will  occur  in  anocracies  than  
autocracies,  so  H1  is  substantiated:  these  results  follow  on  the  heels  of  the  theories  of  previous  
studies  and  add  weight  to  the  “U-shape”  hypothesis  of  more  conflict  in  middle  regimes.  Because  
ethnic  conflict  occurs  when  ethnicity  is  the  salient  political  division  within  society,  the  
implication  of  this  result  is  that  ethnically  divided  regimes  that  can  be  classified  as  anocracies  
have  a  higher  likelihood  of  experiencing  ethnic  conflict  than  their  autocratic  counterparts.  
The  results  when  testing  this  effect  on  the  levels  of  ethnic  conflict  as  measured  through  
battle  deaths  (soldier  and  civilian)  are  less  clear.  H4  suggests  that  anocracies  would  have  higher  
levels  of  conflict  and  conflict-related  deaths  than  autocracies.  We  find  that  there  is  a  marked,  
significant  negative  effect  on  the  level  of  casualties  when  the  regime  is  an  anocracy  as  opposed  
to  an  autocracy.  The  coefficient  of  -0.85  means  that,  for  a  one-unit  change  in  regime  type,  the  
log-casualty-count  would  be  expected  to  drop  by  that  amount:  H4  is  therefore  not  substantiated.  
This  is  a  surprising  finding,  and  indicates  that  an  increased  likelihood  of  ethnic  conflict  does  not  
necessarily  mean  an  increased  level  of  conflict.  There  are  several  potential  theoretical  and  
methodological  causes  of  the  difference.  Theoretically,  it  is  possible  that  there  is  simply  a  
different  pattern  happening  within  this  subset  of  regimes,  where  perhaps  more  localized  and  
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frequent  conflicts  break  out  on  a  smaller  scale  than  those  that  happen  within  autocracies.  To  
isolate  these  differences,  the  time-series  data  of  conflict  can  be  further  disaggregated  past  the  
country-year  level,  with  geospatial  analysis  to  determine  event  clusters;  different  patterns  of  
repression  or  resolution  could  possibly  also  be  at  play.  Anocracies  are  regimes  that,  among  other  
things,  have  some  democratic  character  that  could  positively  impact  conflict  resolution.   
One  methodological  concern  echoes  Vreeland  (2008) ;  the  XRREG  component  variable  100
of  the  Polity  IV  score  includes  within  it  a  ranking  of  whether  the  executive  was  removed  forcibly  
through  conflict,  which  can  create  a  false  positive  in  Model  M1  above,  because  this  ranking  is  
tied  to  whether  conflict  was  currently  occurring.   Regimes  categorized  as  anocracies  with  a  101
ranking  heavily  influenced  by  this  conflict  rating  may  make  the  entire  anocracy  category  ‘more  
likely’  to  experience  conflict,  when  commonalities  among  them  that  potentially  influence 
conflict  are  fewer  than  expected,  leading  to  a  lower  level  of  conflict  than  ‘consolidated  
autocracies’.  Another  general  concern  surrounding  this  kind  of  broad  bucket  regime  type  is  the  
reflection  in  aggregate  results  of  potentially  mixed  results  among  various  axes  of  that  regime.  
One  characteristic  of  an  ‘anocracy’,  like  the  presence  of  a  legislature,  can  have  a  negative  effect  
on  the  likelihood  of  conflict,  whereas  another  characteristic  like  the  presence  of  multiple  parties  
can  have  a  positive  effect  on  the  likelihood  of  conflict,  as  had  been  demonstrated  previously.  102
The  results  observed  in  the  models  above  may  be  capturing  the  net  effect  of  these  differences.   
Ultimately,  none  of  these  potential  reasons  for  mixed  results  can  be  ruled  out  without  
further  analysis  with  variables  and  extensions  outside  of  the  scope  of  the  current  study.  These  
variations  are  explored  further  in  Chapter  5.  The  strengths  of  regressing  conflict  on  specific  
characteristics  like  party  system  and  military  involvement,  seen  in  the  following  two  tables,  are  
100  Vreeland,  “The  Effect  of  Political  Regime  on  Civil  War”,  401-25. 
101  Marshall  et  al.,   “Polity  IV  Project:  Political  Regime  Characteristics  and  Transitions,  1800-2018.” 
102  Wright  and  Escribà-Folch,  “Authoritarian  Institutions  and  Regime  Survival”,  283-286. 
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precisely  that  they  run  into  few  of  the  same  issues.  In  the  subset  of  non-democracies  used,  none  
are  transitional  and  do  not  code  for  conflict,  and  the  results  are  more  indicative  of  the  specific  
effects  of  different  systems  within  regimes.  
 
Table  2  shows  the  effects  of  party  systems-  specifically,  multiple  parties-  on  the  
occurrence  and  level  of  conflict  within  non-democracies.  H2  hypothesizes  that  regimes  with  
multiple  parties  will  more  likely  experience  ethnic  conflict  than  regimes  with  one  party  or  less.  
This  hypothesis  is  substantiated  in  the  above  findings  with  a  significant  positive  effect  in  M2.  A  
one-increment  increase  in  party  system  leads  to  an  increase  of  0.537  in  log-odds  of  conflict,  
which  means  that  a  regime  with  multiple  parties  has  an  increased  odds  of  ethnic  conflict,  1.711:1,  
when  compared  to  regimes  without  multiple  parties.  
M5  tests  H5,  which  proposes  that  there  is  a  positive  relationship  between  the  presence  of  
multiple  parties  and  increased  levels  of  ethnic  conflict.  While  M5  finds  a  slight  negative  effect  of  
multiple  parties  on  levels  of  conflict,  this  finding  is  not  statistically  significant-  with  the  included  
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margin  of  error,  the  relationship  can  be  either  slightly  negative  or  slightly  positive.  Therefore,  
this  proposed  relationship  is  not  substantiated.  The  presence  of  multiple  parties  has  no  tangible  
effect  on  the  level  of  conflict  as  observed  through  casualties.  
 
Table  3,  similar  to  Table  2,  tests  the  influence  of  another  aspect  of  a  regime  on  conflict-  
the  presence  of  military  involvement.  Because  both  characteristics  come  from  the  same  dataset  
source,  the  number  of  observations  tested  are  the  same.  
H3  postulates  that  an  increased  level  of  military  involvement  will  increase  the  odds  of  
ethnic  conflict,  as  measured  in  the  next  year.  By  this  measurement,  the  military  can  either  be  
involved  in  the  government  past  traditional  security  affairs,  or  is  not  involved.  Model  M3  finds  a  
very  strong  influence  of  military  involvement  on  the  likelihood  of  ethnic  conflict,  yielding  a  
positive  coefficient  of  0.706.  This  ultimately  means  that,  when  military  involvement  is  present  
in  the  regime,  the  odds  of  ethnic  conflict  occurring  increase  by  a  factor  of  over  2:1.  H3  is  
substantiated;  when  the  military  is  involved  in  politics  in  an  ethnically  divided  regime,  the  
51  
likelihood  of  ethnic  conflict  increases.  H6  proposes  that  an  increased  level  of  military  
involvement  will  increase  the  levels  of  ethnic  conflict  as  observed  through  casualties.  This  effect  
is  observed  in  Model  M6,  which  finds  a  significant,  large  positive  effect  of  1.123  on  the  
log-casualty-count  with  a  change  to  military  involvement  in  the  regime.  
The  effect  of  party  systems  on  conflict  is  mixed,  but  the  effect  of  military  involvement  in  
the  regime  on  conflict  is  astounding.  The  presence  of  multiple  parties  increases  the  likelihood  of  
ethnic  conflict,  as  does  the  presence  of  military  involvement  in  government.  While  both  had  
strong  effects,  the  military  effect  was  notable.  The  mixed  results  found  for  levels  of  conflict  are  
more  interesting,  because  this  particular  comparison  is  novel.  The  presence  of  multiple  parties  
does  not  have  any  significant  or  observable  effect  on  the  level  of  conflict;  this  suggests  that  there  
exists  no  true  relationship  between  casualty  outcomes  and  parties  that  are  present.  It  
underscores  the  point  found  in  Table  1,  that  there  is  not  necessarily  any  tie  between  an  increased  
likelihood  of  conflict  and  an  increased  or  decreased  level  of  conflict.  Military  involvement,  on  
the  other  hand,  increases  the  level  of  conflict  easily  beyond  any  other  factor  tested.  These  
findings  have  exciting  implications  for  the  study  of  regime  effects  on  conflict  outcomes,  which  
are  explored  further  in  the  following  chapter.  
Limitations 
I  find  it  beneficial  to  discuss  some  of  the  limitations  present  within  this  particular  
analysis.  It  is  important  to  note  that  this  is  a  preliminary  study  of  these  particular  variables;  no  
one  has  compared  regime  characteristics  and  ethnic  conflict  in  quite  this  way  before.  While  M1  
and  H1  essentially  replicate  previous  studies  by  testing  regime  type  effects  on  the  onset  of  
conflict  (although  ethnic  conflict  specifically),  every  other  comparison  is  novel.  The  variable  
‘level  of  conflict’,  in  particular,  is  rudimentary:  deaths  attributed  to  battle  are  an  important  
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component,  but  indirect  deaths  and  duration  of  conflict  as  measures  of  intensity  are  also  
important  to  include  in  future  studies.  
A  central  concern  of  this  study  is  data  aggregation  level  and  causality.  Assessing  the  
spread  of  conflict  and  the  pattern  of  casualties  is  difficult  from  a  data  collection  standpoint.  
Furthermore,  the  direction  of  causality  is  difficult  to  assess  with  complete  certainty  within  the  
limits  posed  by  data  currently.  This  has  been  remedied  in  part  by  lagging  the  variables,  but  
events  that  take  place  within  the  same  year  at  different  points  of  time  are  important  inclusions  
in  the  dataset  that  cannot  currently  be  done.  For  example,  it  is  possible  that  a  conflict  occurs  
earlier  in  the  year,  and  military  involvement  increases  as  a  consequence  later  in  the  year,  which  
would  mean  that  the  causal  relationship  would  be  reversed.   
A  bigger  concern  in  this  direction  is  mid-year  regime  change,  which  is  recorded  in  some  
datasets  as  occurring  in  the  next  year.  Therefore,  regime  change  as  a  consequence  of  conflict  is  
recorded  as  ‘no  authority’  in  some  datasets,  whereas  it  is  noted  in  the  following  year  as  change  in  
others.  This  also  requires  disaggregation,  to  the  day  or  week  level.  However,  current  datasets  
almost  all  aggregate  at  a  country-year  level,  which  makes  any  modification  a  field-wide  effort.  103
A  second  point  is  that  data  is  continuously  emerging;  for  M5  and  M6,  where  sample  count  is  
relatively  low  (N  =  237),  added  data  points  could  prove  beneficial.  The  time  period  described  in  
this  study  is  narrow,  16  years,  which  is  a  strength  in  this  regard,  because  conflict  trends  across  
time  are  largely  not  incorporated  and  do  not  affect  the  study.  
The  explanatory  regime  characteristics  tested  in  this  study  are  limited  and  can  be  
expanded,  and  must  be  compared  to  counterparts  in  other  datasets  for  the  most  accurate  result.  
The  dataset  V-Dem  has  multiple  measures  of  electoral  democracy  that  examine  particular  
aspects  of  the  electoral  scheme,  which  would  help  to  pinpoint  more  aspects  of  the  regime  than  
103  A  notable  exception  to  this  rule  is  the  ACLED  data  family,  whose  data  is  more  disaggregated;  however,  
regime-level  data  is  present  consistently  at  a  country-year  level,  making  this  difficult  to  use  in  tandem  with  those  sets.  
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just  the  type  of  party  system  present.   Comparing  these  measures  to  the  institutional  data  104
provided  by  Svolik  (2012)  will  capture  essential  electoral  aspects  and  their  effects  on  conflict,  
which  may  have  been  left  out  of  the  initial  analysis .  Furthermore,  the  dependent  measure  of  105
levels  of  conflict  would  benefit  from  multiple  sub-components  as  opposed  to  pure  casualties-  
this  raises  questions  of  whether  there  are  other  aspects  at  play,  like  access  to  arms,  urban-rural  
differences,  and  overall  population  health,  to  name  a  few.  Many  of  these  would  become  new  
control  variables.  
A  second  portion  of  this  limitation  is  that  the  strength  and  weakness  of  states  is  not  what  
this  study  has  tested.  One  portion  of  the  definition  of  strength  of  a  state  is  its  monopoly  on  
violence,  which  can  be  influenced  by  its  regime.  This  study  only  goes  as  far  as  assessing  whether  
certain  regime  characteristics  lend  themselves  to  increasing  the  likelihood  or  level  of  conflict,  
and  this  strength  variable  would  be  an  addition  to  the  model  that  could  potentially  influence  the  
outcome.  Additionally,  some  of  the  variables  have  ordinal  rankings  which  in  this  study  are  
converted  to  binomial  measures  because  of  the  specific  research  objective.  Testing  incremental  
differences  among  ordinal  rankings  is  challenging,  but  could  prove  useful  to  demonstrate  
changes  in  conflict  between  regimes  with  some  military  involvement  and  others  with  high  
military  involvement,  for  example.  
Finally,  the  interactions  of  ethnic  groups  at  the  center  of  power  and  in  society  are  just  
beginning  to  be  understood.  While  much  of  the  theory  surrounding  this  point  has  supported  the  
creation  of  my  hypotheses,  there  exists  no  direct  proxy  variable  within  the  model  for  ethnic  
fractionalization.  It  is  possible  that  the  size  of  ethnic  groups,  or  the  extent  to  which  they  are  
represented  in  government,  has  an  impact  on  the  likelihood  or  level  of  conflict.  The  number  of  
groups  is  included  only  as  a  control  measure-  including  measures  of  fractionalization  as  
104  Coppedge  et  al.,  “V-Dem  Codebook  v8.” 
105  Milan  W.  Svolik,  The  Politics  of  Authoritarian  Rule ,  2-25. 
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explanatory  variables  would  perhaps  yield  results  indicating  that  institutions  within  
non-democracies  are  only  the  channels  for  expressions  of  ethnic  power  imbalance,  and  not  that  
they  in  and  of  themselves  affect  the  preponderance  of  ethnic  conflict.  Including  this  variable  was  
out  of  scope  for  this  particular  study,  but  could  have  far-reaching  effects  if  tested  in  tandem  with  
institutional  data  against  conflict  outcomes.   
   
55  
Chapter  5   
Applications  and  Discussion  
 
Summary 
In  this  chapter,  I  will  discuss  my  findings,  their  broader  implications  for  this  research  
objective,  and  their  potential  impact  on  this  field  of  study.  Then,  I  will  explore  several  extensions  
of  this  project  that  are  intriguing  and  will  likely  provide  more  insight  into  the  broader  questions  
that  the  above  findings  raise.  Finally,  I  will  synthesize  the  important  points  of  this  thesis  and  
finish  with  some  commentary  on  ethnic  conflict  as  a  whole.  
Implications  of  Findings 
Despite  the  significant  findings  of  M1,  which  substantiates  H1,  the  theoretical  weakness  
remains  for  this  method  of  classification  for  regime  type.  As  mentioned  in  Chapter  4,  the  blanket  
designation  of  “anocracy”  tells  an  observer  little  of  what  defines  that  regime  as  a  hybrid  regime,  
or  why  it  is  not  considered  a  consolidated  autocracy.  While  the  broader  “U-shape”  hypothesis  
has  been  observed  by  other  authors  and  has  been  substantiated  even  in  this  experiment  with  
ethnic  conflict  as  well,  the  study  of  civil  and  ethnic  conflict  across  regimes  has  advanced  
significantly  enough  that  it  is  time  to  leave  blanket  terms  like  this  in  the  past.  The  emergence  of  
different  typologies  mean  that  models  can  be  recreated  with  different  and  better  measures  for  
regime  characteristics,  and  this  study  is  able  to  acknowledge  these  differences  in  M2-5  and  
M3-6.  
Ethnically  divided  regimes  with  multiple  parties  are  more  likely  to  have  ethnic  conflict  
than  their  counterparts  without  multiple  parties.  This  has  interesting  implications  for  
competitive  authoritarian  regimes  in  particular,  confirming  the  idea  that  partial  democratization  
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through  the  implementation  of  parties  is  only  partly  beneficial.  As  mentioned  previously,  not  
only  does  the  presence  of  multiple  parties  increase  the  motives  for  constituency  formation,  
allowing  contenders  to  deepen  existing  ethnic  divides,  but  it  also  increases  instability  among  
elites.  This  is  substantiated  in  M2.  What  is  not  substantiated  is  the  mobilization  theory-  that  
increased  mobilization  will  occur  as  a  result  of  multiple  parties  competing,  and  therefore  will  
lead  to  an  increased  level  of  conflict  should  it  break  out.  The  finding  is  instead  that  there  is  no  
significant  difference  between  the  levels  of  conflict  with  or  without  multiple  parties.  Although  
unexpected,  this  finding  shows  either  that  there  are  nuanced  influences  from  this  system  that  
may  cancel  out  at  a  higher  level,  or  that  there  is  simply  no  good  direct  tie  between  the  party  
system  of  a  regime  and  the  levels  of  conflict  seen.  
The  finding  that  military  involvement  in  non-democratic  regimes  increases  the  
likelihood  and  level  of  ethnic  conflict  is  striking  and  expected.  This  expands  on  the  work  of  
authors  such  as  Weeks  (2012),  who  finds  variation  among  non-democracies,  but  observes  as  a  
whole  that  military  officials  in  a  leader’s  coalition  tend  to  promote  the  use  of  force  to  “settle  
political  matters”  when  compared  to  their  civilian  counterparts.   It  comes  as  no  surprise,  then,  106
that  conflict  is  more  likely  and  more  severe  when  such  entities  are  involved  in  the  political  
aspects  of  a  regime.  Furthermore,  one  of  the  main  guiding  factors  for  recognizing  genocide  is  the  
ability  of  aggrieved  groups  to  organize ,  to  provide  arms  and  disseminate  propaganda.   This  107
ability  is  arguably  greater  in  a  regime  which  actively  promotes  genocide  and  which  has  the  
infrastructure  to  be  able  to  organize  ground  support  through  an  integrated  military.  As  such,  the  
intensity  of  ethnic  conflict  is  surely  higher,  captured  in  this  study  through  the  metric  of  conflict  
casualties.  These  findings  provide  empirical  support  for  this  observation,  underscoring  the  
106  Weeks,  “Strongmen  and  Straw  Men”,  343. 
107  Stanton,  Dr.  Gregory  G.  “The  Ten  Stages  of  Genocide”. 
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urgency  with  which  widespread  ethnic  conflict  and  violence  must  be  prevented  in  
non-democracies  with  such  characteristics.  
Extensions 
The  first,  and  most  powerful,  extension  to  this  particular  research  question  would  be  
geospatial  analysis  in  two  stages.  Although  previous  studies  have  found  that  adding  a  dummy  
variable  for  region  or  continent  changes  little  in  the  way  of  statistically  significant  results,  
examining  ethnic  conflict  data  through  the  lens  of  geographic  clustering  would  add  additional  
nuance  to  findings  like  those  in  M1  and  M4,  where  overall  likelihood  of  conflict  in  ‘anocracies’  is  
found  to  be  higher  despite  a  trend  of  lower  casualties  as  compared  to  an  autocracy.  Urban-rural  
differences  in  ethnic  conflict  would  become  apparent,  which  is  highly  relevant  to  inter-elite  
politics  in  autocratic  regimes.  The  second  stage  of  this  analysis  would  make  use  of  emerging  
cross-border  data,  which  examines  ethnic  groups  that  exist  in  multiple  countries  which  are  often  
clustered  as  well.  The  Great  Lakes  region  of  Africa  is  a  particular  example,  explained  in  the  
Rwanda  case  study  earlier.  As  seen  here,  ethnic  groups  and  divisions  that  become  politically  
salient  in  other  countries  can  influence  the  behavior  of  the  whole  region;  this  effect  on  conflict  is  
notable  in  various  cases,  but  formally  including  this  within  the  model  would  advance  the  
understanding  of  the  influence  of  such  groups  both  on  the  behavior  of  the  regime  and  on  the  
likelihood  of  conflict.  
A  second  extension  would  be  changing  the  variables  or  their  interpretations  to  further  
test  the  research  question.  One  method  is  to  change  the  explanatory  variables  that  are  tested  
against  occurrence  and  levels  of  ethnic  conflict.  Following  the  nature  of  this  study,  methods  of  
legislative  selection  and  executive  selection  could  be  tested,  because  the  behavior  of  ethnic  
groups  would  potentially  change  under  variations  of  each  system.  For  example,  it  is  plausible  
that  the  rules  of  executive  selection  would  change  motivations  for  using  ethnic  groups  or  various  
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ethnic  cleavages  as  a  means  to  gain  support.  Additionally,  a  study  of  legislative  selection  and  
ethnic  power  imbalances  within  the  regime  could  indicate  how  selection  of  representatives  
varies  to  possibly  embody  those  imbalances  and  tip  them  over  into  conflict.   
Finally,  the  broader  question,  of  regime  effects  on  ethnic  conflict,  is  not  just  applicable  to  
non-democracies,  although  that  is  what  is  tested  here.  Democracies  are  misconstrued  to  be  
more  peaceful  than  other  kinds  of  regimes,  but  the  “democratic  peace”  applies  only  to  interstate  
conflict  among  democracies:  in  fact,  repression  within  democracies  is  a  well-documented  
phenomenon .  I  found  that  ~40%  of  country-years  with  ethnic  conflict  occurred  in  108
democracies  as  classified  by  Polity  IV,  indicating  that  ethnic  conflict  is  quite  impactful  even  
within  the  democratic  subset.   However,  much  of  the  theory  that  has  been  applied  to  109
non-democracies  cannot  be  applied  to  democracies;  for  instance,  there  is  no  concept  of  testing  
whether  the  presence  of  multiple  parties  increases  the  likelihood  of  conflict.  Ethnic  conflict  
within  democracies  will  surely  look  different  than  that  which  appears  in  non-democracies  as  
presented  within  this  paper,  but  to  what  extent  will  no  doubt  prove  surprising.  
Conclusion 
The  desire  to  explore  ethnic  conflict  fundamentally  stemmed,  for  me,  from  a  desire  to  
understand  the  human  condition.  Through  this  study,  we  have  proved  that  the  nature  of  
ethnicity  itself  is  fluid  and  can  be  used  with  varying  degrees  of  success  in  politics  for  the  pursuit  
of  power.  Variables  like  the  number  of  ethnic  groups,  or  the  number  of  people  in  a  country,  have  
not  taken  away  from  the  effects  of  certain  influences  within  non-democratic  regimes  on  ethnic  
conflict.  There  is,  then,  an  organizational  component  to  ethnic  conflict  which  is  bigger  than  any  
one  person  or  identity.  This  knowledge  is  valuable  (in  the  same  way  other  advances  in  this  topic  
108  Davenport,  “State  Repression  and  Political  Order”,  1-3. 
109  Marshall  et  al.,   “Polity  IV  Project:  Political  Regime  Characteristics  and  Transitions,  1800-2018.” 
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have  been)  to  informing  policy  goals  and  perspectives  on  politics.  Although  non-democracies  
account  for  the  majority  of  ethnic  conflict  country-years  within  this  period,  the  fact  remains  that  
within  these  regimes  there  is  a  tremendous  amount  of  variation.  This  variation  then  has  a  great  
deal  of  influence  on  the  scale  of  ethnic  conflict.  Encouraging  the  exploration  of  what  specifically  
acts  as  a  catalyst  for  ethnic  conflict  can  help  us  learn  where  and  why  it  breaks  out,  which  then  
pushes  us  further  to  predict  certain  risks  that  some  regimes  have  which  others  may  not.  The  
pursuit  of  peace  is  a  never  ending  task,  but  understanding  the  one  hundred  colors  of  ethnic  
conflict  brings  us  one  step  closer  to  achieving  that  ultimate  goal. 
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Appendix  A:  Supplemental  Figures  
 
Fig.  1  (re-included):  Hypothesis  Matrix  and  Divisions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.  2:  Me  at  Golconda  Fort,  Hyderabad,  on  Dec.  23,  2019 
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Appendix  B:  Variable  Coding  and  Recoding  
Explanatory  Variables 
Regime  Type  
Since  the  sample  is  limited  to  all  non-democracies,  the  two  regime  types  are  anocracies  
and  autocracies.  Epstein  et  al.  (2006)  use  a  Polity  score  of  -10  to  0  for  autocracies,  and  1  to  7  for  
anocracies;  Fearon  and  Laitin  (2003)  use  -10  to  -5  for  autocracies,  and  -4  to  5  for  anocracies.  110111
In  the  vein  of  previous  studies,  I  have  used  the  Polity  score  to  segment  regime  type,  choosing  to  
use  -10  to  -5  for  autocracies  and  -4  to  5  for  anocracies.  Although  the  cutoffs  can  vary,  this  
captures  the  majority  of  regimes  that  would  follow  the  theoretical  conflict  patterns  proposed.  
This  was  re-coded  as  a  binomial  variable,  with  anocracy  =  1  and  autocracy  =  0,  to  model  a  
hypothetically  positive  relationship  between  change  in  regime  and  change  in  likelihood  and  
levels  of  conflict.  
Regime  Characteristics  
For  both  party  system  and  military  involvement,  the  sample  of  countries  coded  as  
non-democracies  differed  slightly  from  the  Polity  IV  subset.  Svolik’s  specific  classification  gave  
regimes  a  ‘democracy’,  ‘no  authority’,  or  ‘dictatorship’  score.  The  codebook  definition  of  ‘no  
authority’  included  conflict  as  a  potential  factor,  meaning  that  any  use  of  ‘no  authority’  
country-years  as  part  of  the  explanatory  variables  for  conflict  would  be  tautological.  As  a  result,  
country-years  were  limited  to  ‘dictatorships’  only,  which  were  found  in  the  sub-dataset,  
“Institutions  in  Dictatorships”,  referred  to  in  the  following  sections .  112
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Regime  Characteristic-  Party  System   
The  “Institutions  in  Dictatorships”  dataset  classifies  parties  per  country-year  in  
dictatorships  as  either  banned ,  single ,  or  multiple .  Since  presence  of  multiple  parties  was  the  
causal  factor  of  interest,  this  was  made  a  binomial  variable,  with  0  coding  for  one  or  no  party  
and  1  coding  for  the  presence  of  multiple  parties. 
Regime  Characteristic-  Level  of  Military  Involvement:   
The  “Institutions  in  Dictatorships”  dataset  classifies  the  levels  of  military  involvement  as  
civilian  (no  involvement  outside  of  security  affairs),  indirect ,  and  direct  (corporate/personal) .  
Direct  involvement  includes  the  head  of  the  executive  being  a  military  official-  indirect  denotes  
an  influence  but  no  direct  representation.  Because  the  presence  of  military  involvement  at  all  
was  the  causal  factor  of  interest,  this  was  re-coded  as  a  binomial  variable,  with  civilian  [no  
involvement]  coded  as  0  and  any  other  level  of  involvement  coded  as  1.  113
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Appendix  C:  Supplemental  Methods 
 
Table  4:  Hypothesis  and  Model  Summary  Table  [rotated] 
